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THE WORLD BANK AND JUDICIAL REFORM: 
OVERCOMING “BLIND SPOTS” IN THE 
APPROACH TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
ROBERTO LAVER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his book The Rule of Law, the late Lord Tom Bingham makes it 
clear that the principle of “rule of law does not import unqualified 
admiration of the law,” judges, or lawyers.1  However, as the author rightly 
adds, one would rather live in a country that respects such a principle than 
one which does not. Generally speaking, the rule of law means that all 
persons are bound by the law and no one is above the law. And, as the 
eminent jurist points out and most would agree, an independent judiciary is 
fundamental to the rule of law. Such independence is not limited to the 
political branches of government; it also extends to any particular 
individual or group. Yet, given their potential power and interests, it is 
most important for judges to be free from interference by the executive and 
legislative authorities. 
Unfortunately, most people do not enjoy the blessings of the rule of 
law. They live in countries where the image of Lady Justice, wearing her 
blindfold, is simply that—an image far removed from reality—her 
blindfold often removed or not there to begin with. Impartial justice is rare: 
seldom dispensed without fear or favor and regardless of money or power. 
In many settings, there is a cultural disregard for the rule of law and values 
of independence and impartiality. An illustration of this grim reality is 
depicted in the New York Times series “Above the Law,” the winner of the 
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 1.  TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 9 (2010). 
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most recent Pulitzer Prize for international reporting.2 This series of 
journalistic materials, produced by Ellen Barry and Clifford Levy, shows 
widespread abuse of power in Russia’s justice system and violence against 
rights and opposition activists, jurors, and journalists.3 They clearly 
demonstrate a culture of impunity with no respect for the rule of law, 
judicial independence or impartiality.4 Constitutional safeguards to ensure 
judicial independence exist, but they do not work in practice. 
Examples of pervasive government abuse such as this abound 
worldwide. Their devastating effects on society make it clear why building 
the rule of law and functioning judiciaries has become a central concern of 
the international development community. The World Bank (“the Bank”), 
arguably the premier development institution, recognizes that countries 
with weak legal and judicial systems are economically and socially 
impaired.5 For about two decades, the Bank has been a key player in 
helping to strengthen judiciaries in developing countries, providing 
significant financial and technical assistance for justice reform. As of its 
last compendium, issued in 2009, the Bank’s justice sector assistance and 
reform portfolio comprised nearly 2,500 justice reform activities in 
developing or transition countries.6 These activities take many operational 
forms and span all Bank operational instruments: including loans or credits, 
grants, technical assistance, and research. Central to this portfolio are the 
“stand-alone” operations, those lending operations that take justice sector 
institutions as their primary focus. 
This Article analyzes the manner in which the Bank evaluates and 
addresses judicial independence in its portfolio of stand-alone operations. It 
focuses particularly on the independence of judges from political power. It 
shows that the Bank fails to evaluate political interference in the judicial 
process in a coherent, consistent and comprehensive manner and to address 
the underlying cultural forces. Section I describes the legal basis for the 
Bank’s engagement in judicial reform and reviews the development of the 
Bank’s thinking and strategy. Its emphasis is on how such strategy affirms 
 
 2.  See The 2011 Pulitzer Prize Winners: International Reporting, THE PULITZER PRIZES, 
http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2011-International-Reporting (last visited May 18, 2011). 
 3.  E.g., Clifford J. Levy, Russian Journalists, Fighting Graft, Pay in Blood, N.Y. TIMES, May 
17, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/europe/18impunity.html. 
 4.  See id. 
 5.  The World Bank is composed of two unique development institutions, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development 
Association (IDA). The IBRD focuses on middle-income countries and creditworthy poor 
countries while IDA focuses on the poorest countries in the world. IBRD provides low-
interest loans and IDA provides interest-free credits and grants to developing countries. 
WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, at 1 n.5 (2009). 
 6.  Id. at 4. 
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the strategic significance and centrality of judicial independence to judicial 
reform efforts. The Article then moves from the Bank’s strategy to its 
practice. Section II comprehensively examines the Bank’s portfolio of 
stand-alone operations, analyzing how the Bank addresses judicial 
independence in such projects in light of its strategy. It examines to what 
extent the problem of political interference in the judicial process informs 
and shapes the Bank’s assistance for judicial reforms. Finally, Section III 
makes recommendations for better assessing true political commitment to 
judicial independence and deepening the focus on the relationship between 
judicial independence and culture. 
I. JUDICIAL REFORM: MANDATE AND STRATEGY 
The foray into judicial reform activities by the Bank required serious 
consideration of its mandate to pursue these aims. The Bank is not free to 
pursue any activity it wishes; the respective activity must fall within its 
economic development mandate as interpreted by the appropriate bodies.7 
For judicial reform, this act of interpretation took place as the Bank defined 
the boundaries for its engagement with governance issues. Discussion of 
the context and details of the Bank’s legal rationale for judicial reform 
assistance follows. 
A. The Bank Charter and Judicial Reform 
Scholars and development practitioners widely accept that a sound 
judicial system, as an essential element of the rule of law, is key to a 
country’s political, economic, and social development.8 A well functioning 
judicial system is required to stimulate investment, both domestically and 
 
 7.  The legal mandates of the World Bank are found in the respective IBRD and IDA Charters or 
Articles of Agreement. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IBRD Articles of 
Agreement] (stating the IBRD’s purposes to “assist in the reconstruction and development of territories 
of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes,” to “promote private 
foreign investment,” and to “promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the 
maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments . . . thereby assisting in raising productivity, the 
standard of living and conditions of labor in [members’] territories”); Articles of Agreement of the 
International Development Association art. I, Jan. 26, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 
[hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement] (stating the IDA’s purposes “to promote economic 
development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the 
world”) available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,content 
MDK:20052360~menuPK:115747~pagePK:83988~piPK:84004~theSitePK:73154,00.html. 
 8.  For a survey of this scholarship, see Richard Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic 
Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 120-23 (1999). 
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from abroad.9 Indeed, private investors seek a judical system that protects 
property and contractual rights, and adjudicates disputes without 
capriciousness or undue outside influence.10 Further, fair and impartial 
judges protect the civil and political rights of citizens such as freedom of 
speech, association, and religion. Judiciaries that are institutionally weak, 
subject to corruption, and heavily politicized cannot fulfill these vital 
roles.11 
While an effective judicial system is important in the developed 
world, it is perhaps even more critical in countries where democracy is 
fresh and the need to institutionalize the rule of law is essential for 
development. In the past two decades, many developing countries have 
made the transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic form of 
governance. In many such transitions, “victims of human rights abuses . . . 
have demanded that [their offenders] be brought to justice.”12 These shifts 
to democracy also brought with them a need for a judicial system that can 
effectively establish confidence in government institutions and practices, 
and governments have also quickly realized that their economic 
 
  9.  See id. For additional World Bank sources on the relationship between functioning judicial 
institutions and economic and social development, see ANA PALACIO, WORLD BANK, LEGAL 
EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR THE WORLD BANK, 2005-2006 (World Bank 
Working Paper No. 48701); WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A 
DECADE OF REFORM (2005); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING 
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS (2002); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM 
PLAN TO MARKET (1996). 
 10.  IBRAHIM SHIHATA, 2 THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 149-50 (2000). 
 11.  The World Bank produces empirical evidence showing the relationship between a sound 
justice sector and development. This includes cross-country data sets that demonstrate a correlation 
between deficiencies in the rule of law and negative economic and social development. See IDA 
Resource Allocation Index (IRAI), WORLD BANK,  http://go.worldbank.org/S2THWI1X60 (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2011); World Bank Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption, WORLD BANK, http:// 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). Doing Business Reports—a 
publication by The International Finance Corporation (IFC)—provide a quantitative measure for 
comparing business regulations in ten indicator sets across 181 countries. Doing Business has found 
that streamlined court processes and faster contract enforcement are associated with a better 
environment for business. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2004: UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATIONS 41-42 (2003). The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS)—developed jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development—comprises surveys of over 4,000 firms in 22 transition countries in the Europe and 
Central Asia Region. The findings of these surveys indicate that firms identify critical obstacles to their 
effective functioning as crime, complex regulations, and judicial performance among others. See 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
data-catalog/BEEPS. 
 12.  See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & VENEZUELAN PROGRAM FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS EDUCATION AND ACTION, HALFWAY TO REFORM: THE WORLD BANK AND THE VENEZUELAN 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 18 (1996) [hereinafter HALFWAY TO REFORM]. 
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development is inextricably linked to an efficient judicial system that can 
impartially resolve commercial disputes.13 
In varying degrees, judiciaries in developing and transition countries 
remain unprepared to respond to these challenges. Judicial systems are 
choked with inefficient procedures that cause unreasonable delays, and 
undermine the courts’ ability to enforce judgments.14 Often, they are 
heavily influenced by (or under the direct control of) the executive or 
legislative branch, thus making it very improbable that a private litigant 
will receive a fair trial against the government.15 Corruption, along with a 
lack of transparency and predictability in court decisions, undermines 
public trust.16 Other barriers to access to justice include  excessive court 
fees, overburdened and inaccessible courthouses, biased judges, and 
cumbersome procedural requirements.17 In addition, judges inexperienced 
in commercial law can leave a country with a body of weak and 
inconsistent jurisprudence.18 
In an effort to deal with these problems, governments in developing 
and transition countries have taken steps to reform their respective judicial 
systems. Many of these initiatives are supported by the international donor 
community. The Bank has engaged in judicial reform operations since the 
early 1990s as a result of the gradual expansion of its mandate and its then-
emerging governance agenda.19 
The concept of governance emerged out of the Bank’s experience with 
its own portfolio. By the late 1980s, it became clear that the Bank’s 
structural adjustment programs were not producing the expected results in 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See id. at 19. 
 15.  Id. ; SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 151. 
 16.  HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 19-20. 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  See SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 151 (pointing to the problem of judicial inexperience in 
applying new legislation). 
 19.  Initially, the World Bank adopted a narrow interpretation of development as exclusively 
economic growth. Correspondingly, “economic considerations” encompassed “only those issues that 
were directly relevant to the financial and technical feasibility of the projects it was funding and to the 
project’s impact on the economic growth potential of the Member State.” Daniel D. Bradlow, The 
World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 55 (1996) (citing 
United Nations, Statements of U.N. Legal Counsel and IBRD General Counsel on Relations of U.N. 
and IBRD and Effect of U.N. Resolutions, 6 I.L.M. 150 (1967)). However, as notions of development 
have evolved and international political circumstances have changed, the World Bank’s interpretation 
of its mandate has expanded. Beginning in the 1960s, the World Bank’s scope expanded to a broader 
focus on poverty alleviation and sustainable development including new areas of lending such as rural 
development, human resources development (e.g., health, education) the environment, and structural 
reforms. See PAUL MOSLEY ET. AL., 1 AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY BASED 
LENDING 21-23 (1991). 
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many countries. In evaluating the poor performance of its policy-based 
lending in Sub-Saharan Africa, a landmark Bank study in 1989 attributed 
this situation to a “crisis in governance.”20 This study defined governance 
as “the exercise of political power to manage a nations’ affairs” including 
elements such as accountability of leaders to their peoples, transparency of 
transactions, proper administration of public funds, respect for due process 
and human rights, protection of the freedom of press, and independence of 
the judiciary.21 
The 1989 study proved to be a stimulus for debate in the Bank on the 
relationship between governance and its mandate.22 In 1990, the General 
Counsel of the Bank issued a legal opinion on the legitimacy of its 
involvement in judicial reform.23 Under its Charter, the Bank is precluded 
from “interfer[ing] in the political affairs” of its member countries or taking 
into account anything other than “economic considerations” in its lending 
operations.24 In his 1990 legal opinion the General Counsel concluded that 
the Bank “may favorably respond to a country’s request for assistance in 
the field of legal reform, including judicial reform, if it finds it relevant to 
the country’s economic development and to the success of the Bank’s 
lending strategy for the country.”25 
While the political neutrality aspect of its mandate did not prevent the 
Bank’s entry into judicial reform activities, the scope and conditions of its 
participation were unclear. At the time, according to the General Counsel, 
the Bank’s charter only permitted Bank-financed judicial reform projects 
that have “direct and obvious” implications for economic development.26 In 
 
 20.  WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA-FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, A LONG 
TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY 60 (1989). 
 21.  Id. at 15, 22, 60-61, 192. 
 22.  WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (1992). 
 23.  Memorandum of the Vice President and General Counsel of IBRD, Issues of “Governance” 
in the Borrowing Members—The Extent of Their Relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement 
(Dec. 21, 1990). 
 24.  IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 7, art. IV, sec. 10; accord IDA Articles of 
Agreement, supra note 7, art. V, sec. 6; Articles of Agreement of the International Financial 
Corporation art. III, sec. 9, opened for signature May 25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117 
[hereinafter IFC Articles of Agreement]; see also Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency art, 34, Oct. 11, 1985, T.I.A.S. 12089, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99 [hereinafter MIGA 
Convention] (prohibiting decisions to be influenced “by the political character of the member or 
members concerned”). 
 25.  HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 25 (citing Ibrahim Shihata, Judicial Reform in 
Developing Countries and the Role of the World Bank, in WORLD BANK, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 226 (1995)). 
 26.  Id. (quoting Memorandum of Vice President and General Counsel, Issues of “Governance” in 
the Borrowing Members: The Extent of Their Relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement 38 
(Dec. 21, 1990)). Many groups, including the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, have criticized 
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practical terms, such criteria were generally taken to mean that the Bank 
should focus on the business and commercial side of the court system; 
criminal justice was outside of the Bank’s mandate.27 This interpretation 
failed to reflect the interrelation of the different parts of the judiciary 
system. And in addition to this issue of scope, there was no clear guidance 
on the nature of the reforms to be concerned with. Support for 
administrative improvements such as statistics and court records would be 
relatively simple and uncontroversial compared to projects that might 
evaluate and implement measures directly affecting the balance of powers 
between branches of government. It remained unclear whether the Bank 
was legally permitted to address sensitive issues of judicial independence, 
and how far it could go if in fact it was permitted. These issues, however, 
became clearer as the Bank gained project experience and further 
developed its thinking and strategy. 
B. The Bank’s Strategic Directions on Judicial Reform 
The first stand-alone project, the Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure 
project, was approved by the Bank’s board of directors shortly after the 
institution decided on the legitimacy issue as previously discussed.28 This 
may explain in part the narrow focus of this initial operation. The Bank had 
no clear strategic directions for its lending activities in the justice sector. It 
only addressed the administrative and technical aspects of the judicial 
system,29 concentrating its early lending on highly technical issues such as 
capacity building, streamlining management systems, conducting training 
programs, and improvement of physical infrastructure.30 
This first project in Venezuela met with significant criticism both 
within and outside the Bank. Internally, some advocated for a deeper sector 
analysis prior to the identification and preparation of any specific project. 
Externally, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Venezuelan 
Program for Human Rights Education (PROVEA) conducted a 
 
the World Bank for this interpretation, stating that it arbitrarily rejects projects that seek to reform 
criminal codes, train police or criminal court judges or manage penal institutions. Similarly, they argue 
that projects aimed at constitutional reform are likewise denied. By focusing solely on economic 
consequences of judicial reform, these groups contend that World Bank reform projects fail to address 
more fundamental, albeit political, issues, such as against alleged human rights abuses. 
 27.  LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUILDING ON QUICKSAND: THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE WORLD BANK’S JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN PERU 2-3 (2000) [hereinafter BUILDING ON 
QUICKSAND]. 
 28.   World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure Project, at 11, Report 
No. 10635 (July 15, 1992) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992]. 
 29.  See HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 25-26. 
 30.  BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27, at 2-3. 
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comprehensive study of the project.31 Issued during the project’s 
implementation, the study found several problems including a lack of broad 
government commitment to reform, failure to address “crucial structural 
impediments to reform,” failure to address access to justice concerns, and a 
lack of broad-based participation.32 The Bank also failed to gauge the level 
of government commitment to the project prior to implementation. Instead, 
as the Lawyers Committee contends, the Bank “assumed that a successful 
Project would generate a commitment to further reform on the part of the 
judiciary and serve as an example to the legislative and executive 
[branches].”33 
Experience with the Venezuela project prompted a great deal of 
rethinking and analysis within the Bank. By the mid-1990s, the institution, 
through official documents and publications of its then General Counsel 
and other staff, recognized the need to adopt a more comprehensive 
approach in its justice sector operations. It also affirmed the centrality of 
judicial independence, government commitment, and broad-based public 
participation to effective and sustainable judicial reform. Publications of 
both the Bank itself and those of individual Bank officials repeatedly 
identified several crucial issues to be addressed in its judicial reform 
programs: judicial administration, procedural codes, access to justice, legal 
education and training, and judicial independence (actual independence and 
as perceived in the community).34 The issue of judicial independence thus 
became central to judicial reform. 
In a 1996 report, the Bank identified judicial independence as an 
“imperative feature of any judicial reform project.”35 In a separate piece, a 
Bank judicial reform specialist asserted that “efforts to promote judicial 
independence are . . . at the heart of insuring judicial reform.”36 As 
articulated by the then General Counsel, the core function of the judicial 
system encompasses three principal elements: (1) a well-functioning 
judiciary in which judges apply the law in a fair, even, and predictable 
manner without undue delays or unaffordable costs; (2) rules interpreted 
 
 31.  HALFWAY TO REFORM, supra note 12, at 12. 
 32.  Id. at 21. 
 33.  Id. at 102. 
 34.  See SHIHATA, supra note 10; Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience 
in Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 167 (1995); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Judicial Reform in Developing 
Countries and the Role of the World Bank, in WORLD BANK, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 220-26 (1995). 
 35.  BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27, at 3 (citing MARIA DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL 
SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF REFORM 7 (1996) (World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 319)). 
 36.  Dakolias, supra note 34, at 172. 
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and applied according to established procedures; and (3) an independent 
body to resolve disputes.37 
In early 2003, the Bank outlined a strategic framework and 
methodology for designing and preparing legal and judicial activities.38 The 
strategy reaffirmed and further developed the centrality of judicial 
independence to the rule of law and judicial reform. The Bank noted that 
judicial independence “has two functions: one is to limit government power 
and the other is to protect the rights of individuals.”39 It further added that 
“a truly independent judiciary is one that issues decisions and makes 
judgments that are respected and enforced by the legislative and executive 
branches; that receives an adequate appropriation from the legislature; and 
that is not compromised by political attempts to undermine its 
impartiality.”40 Thus the Bank’s definition of judicial independence 
included both individual and institutional elements. In this respect, 
 
Individual independence (decisional independence) is both substantive, 
in that it allows judges to perform the judicial function subject to no 
authority but the law, and personal, in that it guarantees judges job 
tenure, adequate compensation and security. Institutional independence 
affects the operation of the judiciary and adequate resources are an 
important aspect of this.41 
 
 
 37.  Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Framework for Development: The World Bank’s Role in Legal 
and Judicial Reform, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, PROCEEDINGS OF 
A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 14 (1995). 
 38.  WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 55-63 (2003) (World 
Bank Working Paper No. 26916) [hereinafter STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS]. 
 39.  Id. at 3. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 26. In dealing with judicial independence, the strategy reflects accepted international 
principles and standards. See Seventh United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 59 (Sept. 6, 1985) [hereinafter United Nations Basic Principles]; Council of 
Europe, European Charter on the Statute for Judges (Jul. 10, 1998); International Bar Association, IBA 
Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (1982); American Bar Association, Principles on 
Judicial Independence and Fair and Impartial Courts, (Aug. 2007); Shimon Shetreet, Mount Scopus 
Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial Independence (Mar. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Mount 
Scopus Standards]. Because no widespread agreement on a concrete definition of “judicial 
independence” exists, most attempts to define the term consist of lists of factors, which fall into two 
categories of independence: Institutional and Decisional. E.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 
i–ii (1997); See also American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, Justice in 
Jeopardy 8 (2003); Brian K. Landsberg, The Role of Judicial Independence, 16 MCGEORGE GLOBAL 
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 331, 347 (2006). 
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The report recognized that economic growth and poverty reduction 
can be neither sustainable nor equitable without the rule of law.42 It then 
stressed that the rule of law “is built on the cornerstone of an independent, 
efficient, and effective judicial system.”43 In fact, the first pillar of the 
Bank’s new legal and judicial reform strategy was judicial independence.44 
As the Bank affirmed, “First and foremost, the judiciary must be 
independent, impartial, and effective.”45 Creating an institution with these 
qualities “is particularly challenging in countries where the executive 
branch views the judiciary as its instrument for political goals.”46 Thus, 
since legal reform cannot succeed without an independent judicial system, 
the Bank announced that it would direct its efforts in judicial reform at 
“enhancing independence and increasing efficiency and equity in resolving 
disputes by improving access to justice that is not rationed, and by 
promoting private sector development.”47 
The 2003 strategy document additionally argued that judicial integrity 
of individual judges is also critical to judicial independence. Indeed, “The 
essence of an independent and impartial judge lies in his or her personal 
integrity,” and “[j]udicial independence can operate properly only when 
judges are trained in the law and make decisions with integrity and 
impartiality as guardians of public trust.”48 In this respect, the report noted 
that judicial training, a common element in legal and judicial reform, not 
only hinges on improving knowledge “but also changing attitudes.”49 This 
change “is the most difficult area of education in any field,” but “it is the 
essence of reform.”50 For example, judicial training programs may concern 
skills or awareness building designed to help improve judicial integrity or 
reduce judicial bias in fact finding, both of which can especially concern 
issues of gender and ethnicity.51 
Public trust and accountability also relate to judicial independence. As 
the report explained, “Externally, public confidence is essential to maintain 
an independent judiciary that enforces the law.”52 In addition, public trust is 
 
 42.  STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS, supra note 38, at 1. 
 43.  Id. at 2. 
 44.  Id. at 3. 
 45.  Id. at 2. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 26. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 3, 28. 
 50.  Id. at 28. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 26. 
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necessary to enforce judgments even against the executive branch and to 
prosecute and punish judicial corruption. While independence should be 
respected and protected, this is not to say that the judiciary should be free 
from public accountability. 
The Bank also emphasized the need for consensus and support from 
all levels of government and civil society for sustainable reform.53 Several 
Bank publications recognized the necessity of government commitment for 
ensuring that judicial reform projects will succeed. A 1994 Bank report 
stated, “Legal reform cannot be successful without the full conviction and 
political commitment of the government concerned.”54 One year later, the 
Bank expanded on this point: “In order for legal technical assistance to 
bring about the desired results, the recipient governments need to 
demonstrate a clear commitment to legal reform and take full ownership of 
the legal reform process.”55 
As Bank documents developed the importance of government 
commitment, they also began to recognize the importance of participation 
at all levels of project development and implementation. Participation of 
key stakeholders in the evolution of a project is closely linked to the Bank’s 
ownership policy. Citing the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for 
Development, the General Counsel identified the partnership between civil 
society and government as an “important prerequisite for sustainable 
development.”56 He continued, “The World Bank recognizes the integral 
link between participation and the achievement of the Bank’s ultimate 
objective—poverty reduction . . . . Thus, the Bank endeavors to the extent 
possible to include the local community in the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of Bank projects.”57 Increased public participation, according to 
the Bank, will allow those most affected by Bank projects to have a voice 
in their design and execution, and consequently will improve the quality 
and sustainability of those projects.58 
We have dealt so far with principles and strategy. As we discussed in 
the first section, the Bank by the early 1990s decided that it could 
legitimately enter the business of judicial reform. Yet, the scope and 
boundaries remained unclear. By the early 2000s, as seen in this section, 
 
 53.  Dakolias, supra note 34, at 172; SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 149. 
 54.  WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE, THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE 27 (1994). 
 55.  BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27, at 3 (citing WORLD BANK LEGAL DEPARTMENT, 
THE WORLD BANK AND LEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE—INITIAL LESSONS (1995) (World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1414)). 
 56.  SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 59. 
 57.  Id. at 60; see also WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND PARTICIPATION 19 (1994). 
 58.  See SHIHATA, supra note 10, at 61. 
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the Bank devised a strategy in order to better orient and shape its 
operations. The strategy speaks clearly on the Bank’s legitimate and 
priority attention to judicial independence including the concern with 
political intrusiveness. It affirms that there is no truly independent judiciary 
without the respect of the executive and legislative branches. Political 
power must uphold, not undermine, judicial impartiality. As the Bank 
further acknowledges, there is a moral dimension to judicial independence. 
In fact, judicial independence depends on the integrity and impartiality of 
judges as “guardians of public trust.” In this regard, the strategy report 
recognizes that this hinges on “changing attitudes.” While the report 
emphasizes the integrity and attitudinal changes of judges, as we shall 
further discuss, this must be viewed in the context of the broader society 
and its cultural values and expectations. We now turn to the actual practice 
of the Bank. 
II. JUDICIAL REFORM: IN PRACTICE 
This Section comprehensively examines the Bank’s portfolio of stand-
alone operations, analyzing how it addresses judicial independence in such 
projects. It begins with a brief overview of their objectives, elements and 
costs. 
A. The World Bank’s Portfolio of Judicial Reform Projects 
The Bank’s engagement in the justice sector has grown considerably 
in the last two decades, with the approval of thirty-six stand-alone judicial 
reform projects.59 Of these, twenty-one are closed and sixteen remain 
active.60 These operations spread across all geographical regions. While 
some projects focus on one single element (e.g. training or case 
management), others take a comprehensive approach and cover multiple 
elements. An overview of these projects’ objectives, design and costs will 
 
 59.  See World Bank, Directions in Justice Reform: Discussion Note, http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/EXTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/wb_jr_discussionnote.pdf, (last visited April 20, 2011); 
THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
PROJECTS/0,,menuPK:115635~pagePK:64020917~piPK:64021009~theSitePK:40941,00.html (last 
visited April 20, 2011). 
In addition to the closed and active projects, there is one self-standing project in the pipeline (Kenya, 
Judicial Performance Improvement) and five dropped projects (Russian Federation, Judicial Reform 
Support Project; Kenya, Justice and Integrity Project; Sri Lanka, Legal and Judicial Infrastructure 
Development Project; Cambodia, Legal and Judicial Reform Project; and Mozambique, Legal Capacity 
Project). Id. 
 60.  Id. 
LAVER FINAL MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 2/29/2012  3:46 PM 
2012] THE WORLD BANK AND JUDICIAL REFORM 195 
provide a necessary background for the subsequent analysis of the manner 
in which the Bank evaluates and addresses judicial independence.61 
1. Objectives 
Projects may have a single objective or multiple ones. Those with a 
single objective generally concern judicial efficiency. For example, the first 
stand-alone project (Venezuela Judicial Infrastructure Project) had 
objectives to: (1) improve efficiency in the allocation of resources within 
the judiciary, (2) increase courtroom productivity and efficiency, and (3) 
reduce the private sector costs of dispute resolution.62 By increasing 
courtroom productivity and efficiency, the project expected to reduce the 
private sector and individual costs of dispute resolution.63 
The second stand-alone project (Bolivia Judicial Reform) aimed not 
only to improve the efficiency of the judiciary but also, primarily, its 
quality. As the first phase of a long-term program, it sought to “improve the 
quality and effectiveness of civil justice administration,” and to “strengthen 
the capacity of the judiciary . . . and of the Ministry of Justice to prepare, 
review, and implement laws and programs related to the country’s 
constitutional, judicial, economic and social reforms.”64 
In an effort to distinguish the Bolivia project from the previous 
Venezuela operation—highly criticized for its narrow scope, among other 
things—the Bank noted that the former had a more balanced and holistic 
perspective. The project “would aim to increase efficiency through 
improved courtroom administration” but also “seek improvements in the 
quality of the justice provided by the present system.”65 Further, “its 
foundation is reform of the judicial incentive framework and of the judicial 
process itself, thereby striking the necessary balance between quality and 
efficiency issues.”66 While the first Venezuela project emphasized the 
infrastructure aspects of justice administration, the Bolivia project 
“attempted to strike a balance between the policy, organizational and 
infrastructure aspects of justice administration.”67 
 
 61.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 62.  Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28, at 16. 
 63.  Id. at 20. 
 64.  World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Bolivia Judicial Reform Project, at 15, Report No. 
13052 (March 24, 1995) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995]. 
 65.  Id. at 14. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 29. 
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After the Bolivia project, the substantial majority of the Bank’s 
projects declared objectives beyond that of improving efficiency.68 These 
projects generally sought to increase the overall quality or effectiveness of 
the respective judicial systems.69 
Some projects aimed at increasing access to justice. Access to justice 
appears for the first time as an objective in the 1996 Ecuador Judicial 
Reform Project.70 While the main focus of the Ecuador project was on 
judicial efficiency, it also dealt with access issues. The objective of the 
Ecuador Judicial Reform Project was to improve access to justice, the 
efficiency of judicial services, and the participation of civil society in 
judicial reform.71 Other projects which aimed to improve access to justice 
included those in Peru, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Armenia, 
Bangladesh, Philippines, El Salvador, Mongolia, Mexico, and Honduras.72 
The Bangladesh project identified a disincentive to foreign investment as a 
result of significant shortcomings in access to justice that stemmed from 
weak procedure, untrained court staff, and poor physical infrastructure.73 
Judicial independence is an explicit objective in very few projects. 
The first one was the 1997 Peru Judicial Reform Project. In fact, this 
project was cancelled because of insufficient government commitment to 
judicial independence.74 Other projects include the 1999 Georgia Judicial 
Reform Project; the 2000 Armenia Judicial Reform Project; the 2005 Peru 
Justice Services Modernization Project; and the 2006 Sudan Capacity 
Building of the National Judiciary.75 The Georgia project sought to address 
 
 68.  The phrasing of the objectives is not consistent across the projects. In some cases, the 
objective of improving effectiveness includes other aspects such as efficiency and integrity (e.g. Bolivia 
and Philippines projects). Other projects separate the objectives of efficiency, transparency and 
accountability from that of effectiveness. And in other operations, different terms are used such as 
responsiveness, professionalism, competence, predictability, and accountability. 
 69.  See THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, supra note 59. 
 70.  World Bank, Clustered Project Performance Assessment Report, Ecuador Judicial Reform 
Project (Loan 4066), Guatemala Judicial Reform Project (Loan 4401), Colombia Judicial Conflict 
Resolution Project (Loan 7081), Report No. 55277 (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter Clustered PPAR 2010]. 
 71.  Id. at 7. 
 72.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 73.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 23.6 
Million (US$ 30 Million Equivalent) to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for a Legal and Judicial 
Capacity Building Project, at 21, Report No. 21863-BD (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Project Appraisal 
Document: Bangladesh 2001]. 
 74.  See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US 12 
million to the Republic of Peru for a Justices Services Improvement Project, at 9, Report No. 27861-PE 
(February 9, 2004) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004]; BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, 
supra note 27, at 18. 
 75.  As further discussed in the next section, this explicit reference to judicial independence does 
not reflect any significant difference with all other projects. See infra Part II.2. 
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widespread corruption, legal uncertainty, poor enforcement of laws and 
regulations, and inadequate protection of property rights and contracts 
through judicial independence reforms.76 Unfortunately, this explicit 
reference to judicial independence is not dispositive: there is no clear 
distinction between these few projects which explicitly state judicial 
independence as an objective and the other projects in the portfolio which 
do not. 
2. Project Design 
The projects range from those with a narrow scope to others with a 
very comprehensive reach. Some projects focus, either exclusively or 
primarily, on one element such a court administration or judicial training. 
Other projects, such as Albania, support a much broader set of elements 
including legal education, legal information, court administration and case 
management, judicial training, judicial enforcement, and alternative dispute 
resolution. 
As a recent Bank report indicates, the most common judicial reform 
element is court administration and case management. This element is 
included in 89% of projects.77 Many times this element is accompanied by 
infrastructure investments which appear in almost half of the projects.78 
Legal drafting and transparency of legal information is found in 78% of 
projects.79 Legal drafting is very significant in Kazakhstan, Yemen, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Croatia.80 In Kazakhstan, the market reforms 
undertaken during the 1990s required legal institutional changes that lagged 
behind economic reforms. A project addressing legal drafting became 
necessary because new laws often underwent continuous revision and yet 
remained inconsistent with existing laws.81 Access to legal information is a 
primary focus in Venezuela 1997, Kazakhstan, Albania, Morocco, 
Armenia, Croatia, and Mongolia. Some projects target legal education in 
law schools including Albania and Mongolia.82 
 
 76.  See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 
9.9 million (US$ 13. 4 million equivalent) to Georgia for a Judicial Reform Project, at 6, Report No. 
19346-GE (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999]. 
 77.  Directions in Justice Reform: Discussion Note, supra note 59, at 2. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  E.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US 
$16.5 million equivalent to the Republic of Kazakhstan for a Legal Reform Project, at 6, Report No. 
18792-KZ (April 19, 1999) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999]. 
 81.  See id. at 4. 
 82.  E.g., id. at 22. 
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More than half of the projects include training legal professionals, 
including those in the justice sector. The purposes of the training differ 
across projects. In some, the training focuses primarily on management and 
administration (Venezuela 1992, Argentina) or substantive business law 
(e.g. Kazakhstan).83 Most training components, however, have a more 
holistic approach and target knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the 
participants. Ethical training is a key ingredient in several operations.84 In 
Bolivia, the Bank attributed weak judicial autonomy to political patronage, 
a long-standing problem in Bolivia history as the report asserts. Indeed, 
“Political patronage and regional interests are the main forces driving 
personnel decisions, outweighing consideration of professional excellence, 
probity and administrative effectiveness.”85 It stresses that judicial 
appointments and career advancement mostly result from political or 
personal connections.86 These are perverse incentives which the Bank 
project sought to address directly. 
Access to justice components may be found in several operations. 
These include Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), legal aid and public 
outreach programs. Several projects include investments to strengthen 
ADR including Ecuador (mediation), Yemen (training of arbitrators), 
Guatemala (justices of peace, mobile courts, mediation), Sri Lanka 
(mediation), Bangladesh (small case courts, arbitration), Bolivia (justices of 
peace, arbitration), Armenia (arbitration), Colombia (conciliation), 
Philippines (mobile courts), Peru 2004 (community justice), Mexico (small 
claims, public defender and Honduras (mobile courts, arbitration, public 
defenders).87 The Bangladesh project included these small claims and 
arbitration components in order to address a substantial judicial backlog 
that was negatively affecting access to justice.88 
Legal aid, public awareness, and education programs are also 
significant areas of assistance in Georgia, Yemen, Guatemala, Morocco, 
Armenia, Bangladesh, Peru 2004, Honduras, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, 
Armenia, Peru 2010, Philippines, El Salvador, Mongolia, and Mexico.89 
Other special focus areas include (a) judicial selection, evaluation, 
promotion, and disciplinary procedures (found in Peru 1997, Bolivia, Peru 
2004, Honduras, Peru 2010); (b) enforcement of judicial decisions 
 
 83.  See Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995, supra note 64, at 6. 
 86.  Id. at 5. 
 87.  See THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, supra note 59. 
 88.  Project Appraisal Document: Bangladesh 2001, supra note 73. 
 89.  E.g., id. at 41. 
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(Georgia, Armenia and Albania; largest component in Albania); (c) ethics 
infrastructure including “supply” and “demand” side measures (special 
emphasis in Guatemala (whole component), Philippines, El Salvador, Peru 
2004, Mexico); and (d) supporting registries (Morocco (largest 
component), Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan).90 
3. Costs 
The total amount of estimated costs for all projects amounts to over 
US $1.1 billion and the total amount of Bank lending exceeds three 
quarters of a billion dollars.91 The lending amounts for these projects range 
from US $2.4 million to US $130 million.92 Court administration, case 
management, and physical infrastructure represent the largest project 
components in terms of dollar amount investments.93 Further, these 
administration, management, and infrastructure components represent 
about two-thirds of the investments in a majority of the projects, including: 
Venezuela 1992, Ecuador, Peru 1997, Venezuela 1997, Armenia, Georgia, 
Bangladesh, Croatia, Philippines, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru 2004, 
Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, 
Armenia, Colombia, and Croatia.94 In some of these projects, they account 
for virtually the whole investment cost (e.g. Venezuela 1994, Bangladesh, 
El Salvador, Macedonia, Romania, and Croatia).95 Infrastructure alone 
accounts for at least half of the investments in several projects, including 
Venezuela 1992, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Romania, 
Afghanistan, and Armenia.96 The Georgia project document indicates that 
51 percent of the project financing went to infrastructure rehabilitation.97 
This broad overview of the Bank’s portfolio shows a primary 
emphasis on “operational” and “structural” aspects of the judiciary. Issues 
of court administration and case management are prevalent throughout 
virtually all projects. Support for court buildings and other infrastructure 
are substantial. Assistance for more critical issues of judicial selection, 
performance and discipline is largely of a formal and technical nature, 
dealing with new structures, mechanisms and processes. Training of judges 
 
 90.  See, e.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of 
US$9.0 Million to Albania for a Legal and Judicial Reform Project, at 3, Report No. 19915-ALB (Mar. 
1, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000]. 
 91.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  World Bank, Directions in Justice Reform: Discussion Note, supra note 59, at 2. 
 94.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 7. 
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mainly targets knowledge and administrative skills. On the demand side, 
the emphasis lies in access to legal information, legal aid and mechanisms 
for external accountability. Deeper issues concerning the cultural and moral 
foundations and incentives of political leaders, and society at large, for 
values of judicial independence and impartiality are largely ignored or 
marginalized. Next we turn to an inquiry on how the Bank assesses the 
degree of “true” judicial independence from political authorities and how it 
seeks to strengthen such judicial independence in its operations. 
B. The Bank’s Approach to Judicial Independence 
The independence of the judiciary is one of the central pillars on 
which both a liberal democratic system and an efficient and equitable 
market economy rest.98 Among all of the weaknesses of developing country 
judiciaries, a lack of judicial independence is among the most serious, 
because it infringes on the ability of judiciaries to carry out their primary 
responsibilities: dispute resolution, contract enforcement, deterrence of 
crime, and constraining government abuse of power. In this regard, because 
of its actual and potential serious threats to judicial independence, 
protecting judges from political interference is of the highest concern. 
As previously noted, the Bank’s strategy affirms the centrality of 
judicial independence to the rule of law and judicial reform. Indeed, “The 
principle of judicial independence is a central feature of the programs 
undertaken by the Bank.”99 Legal and judicial reform cannot succeed 
without an independent judiciary. According to the Bank, judicial 
independence “has two functions: one is to limit government power and the 
other is to protect the rights of individuals.”100 The Bank accordingly 
defines an independent judiciary as “one that issues decisions and makes 
judgments that are respected and enforced by the legislative and executive 
branches; that receives an adequate appropriation from the legislature; and 
that is not compromised by political attempts to undermine its 
impartiality.”101 
The following analysis of the Bank’s approach to judicial 
independence in its stand-alone judicial reform projects will draw upon the 
appraisal of the projects by the Bank’s operational staff as reflected in the 
respective reports (staff appraisal report (SAR) or project appraisal 
 
 98.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 876 (1975). 
 99.  STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS, supra note 38, at 3. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
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documents (PAD)). These are the key project reports in which “[World] 
Bank staff assess the intrinsic quality of a project and evaluate the critical 
risks to which the project is exposed.”102 In addition to these appraisal 
reports, internal evaluation reports, known as Implementation Completion 
Reports (ICRs) and Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPARs), 
issued by the Bank in regard to closed projects, provide additional valuable 
information.103 Three questions will be addressed: (1) To what extent is 
judicial independence identified and assessed as a judicial sector issue? (2) 
How is judicial independence addressed in the design of the projects? And 
(3) how do the Bank’s internal evaluations deal with judicial 
independence? 
1. To What Extent Is Judicial Independence Identified and Assessed as 
a Sector Issue? 
According to Bank policy, its investment projects must “be anchored 
in country policy/sector analysis; and reflect lessons learned from the 
Bank’s experience.”104 The appraisal reports (SARs and PADs) include 
brief analyses of the respective sector’s salient features. This analysis is 
often based on in-depth analytical work undertaken by the Bank. 
In reviewing the appraisal reports on the judicial reform projects, it is 
hard to find a consistent and coherent approach on the treatment of judicial 
independence. As a starting point, we note that there are a few project 
documents which are either silent on judicial independence as a judicial 
 
 102.  World Bank, Operational Manual, World Bank Procedure 10.00 - Annex D, Jan. 15, 1994, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,co
ntentMDK:20065821~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.h
tml. I recognize that an analysis on the basis of the publicly available written record has its limitations. 
They are not necessarily a perfect and exhaustive source. The insights of this article must be viewed in 
such context and, hopefully, as a small contribution and catalyst for further research and analysis. 
 103.  The ICRs are prepared by a team appointed by the respective regional sector manager or team 
leader at the time of project completion. These reports assess (a) the degree to which the respective 
project achieved its development objective and outputs as set out in the respective project documents; 
(b) other significant outcomes and impacts; (c) prospects for the respective project’s sustainability; and 
(d) World Bank and borrower performance, including compliance with relevant World Bank safeguard 
and business policies. See World Bank, Operational Manual – Implementation Completion Reporting, § 
13.55, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUA 
L/0,,contentMDK:20064672~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:5021
84,00.html. The PPARs are prepared by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group. See World 
Bank, Operational Manual - Monitoring and Evaluation, § 13.60, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:21345677~menuPK:647
01637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html. 
 104.  World Bank, Operational Manual - Investment Lending: Identification to Board Presentation, 
§ 10.00, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/ 
EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20064659~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108
~theSitePK:502184,00.html. 
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sector issue or simply acknowledge that judicial independence is secured or 
part of the government’s strategy for judicial reform.105 In the remaining 
projects, while receiving more attention on the face of the documentary 
evidence, the scope and details of the analysis differ. A number of projects 
identify the problem of judicial independence, either in general or as 
specific manifestations of political interference (i.e. political interference in 
judicial appointments or enforcement of judicial decisions) and refer to 
constitutional and legal reform measures taken by the respective 
governments to strengthen judicial independence.106 
Other projects identify judicial independence as the main or key issue 
facing the respective judiciary.107 At one level, there are project documents 
 
 105.  E.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 
13,600,000 to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for a Legal and Judicial Reforms Project, 
Report No. 20135-CE (May 12, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Sri Lanka 2000] 
(giving limited sector analysis with no mention of judicial independence); World Bank, Project 
Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$18.2 million to the Republic of El 
Salvador for a Judicial Modernization Project, Report No. 24201-ES (July 5, 2002) [hereinafter Project 
Appraisal Document: El Salvador 2002] (referencing that constitution has secured independence of the 
judiciary); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Lending 
Credit in the Amount of SDR 4.0 Million (US$5.0 Million Equivalent) to Mongolia for a Legal and 
Judicial Reform Project, Report No. 23286-MOG (November 19, 2001) [hereinafter Project Appraisal 
Document: Mongolia 2001] (referencing that judicial independence is one of the values of the 
government’s judicial reform strategy). 
 106.  See, e.g., Project Appraisal Document: Bangladesh 2001, supra note 73, at 6, 85 (referencing 
a relevant Supreme Court judgment and a brief statement in a policy letter declaring that “The 
Government believes in the separation and independence of the judiciary. For that matter appropriate 
steps are being taken. It has already initiated the process of delegating more financial powers and 
autonomy to the Supreme Court.”); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning 
and Innovation Loan in the Amount of US$5.0 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Croatia for Court 
and Bankruptcy Administration Project, at 15, Report No. 19995-HR (June 13, 2001) [hereinafter 
Project Appraisal Document: Croatia 2001] (referencing problems of political interference and 
corruption and to unspecified measures taken by the government to address such issues); Staff 
Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28, at 11 (referencing problems of political influence in 
judicial selection criteria and government reform efforts, including proposed constitutional reforms, to 
de-politicize judicial appointments); World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report on a 
Proposed Loan in the Amount of $US 33 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Guatemala for a Judicial 
Reform Project, at 2 (Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter ICR: Guatemala 2008] (referencing the government’s 
strategy to strengthen judicial independence and related reform measures including the new 
Constitutional Court, the new Judicial Council, a new judicial career, a budgetary earmark for the 
Judiciary, and human rights guarantees); World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Ecuador Judicial Reform 
Project, at 7, Report No. 15385-EC (June 24, 1996) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Ecuador 1996] 
(referencing government’s overall program to de-politicize the judiciary and strengthen independence 
and related reform measures including new mechanisms for selecting judges, a new Constitutional 
Tribunal, a new Ombudsman and independent prosecutor’s office). 
 107.  Two of the earlier World Bank projects with judicial independence as a central focus were 
Bolivia (1995) and Peru (1997). Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995, supra note 64, at 6. In Peru, the 
World Bank attempted to support bold measures to restore judicial independence particularly in relation 
to judicial tenure. However, political interference and the lack of adequate government commitment led 
LAVER FINAL MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 2/29/2012  3:46 PM 
2012] THE WORLD BANK AND JUDICIAL REFORM 203 
that apparently reflect a general de jure assessment of judicial 
independence and distinguish the constitutional and legal independence 
from “independence in practice.” Indeed, the first project to make this 
distinction is the Albania project. As the report states, the Albanian 
judiciary has long suffered from excessive executive interference. It notes 
that “Albania’s new Constitution of November 1998 provides a clear 
foundation for judicial independence and the new law on Judicial 
Organization gives further legislative basis for this independence.”108 To 
achieve independence in practice, however, the Bank contends that judges 
“will need the tools to help them operate independently.”109 These tools 
include education, safety, reasonable working conditions and salaries, legal 
information, effective court and case management procedures, and a non-
corrupt environment. The Morocco project follows the same approach as 
the Albania project. While the Bank notes that there is de jure judicial 
independence in Morocco, it adds that judges need the tools to achieve 
“independence in practice.”110 
At another level, one finds a few project documents reflecting explicit 
criteria for evaluating judicial independence. A good example is the case of 
Armenia. In this operation, the Bank is not only more candid about the 
specific manifestations of a weak judicial independence but also assesses 
the necessary improvements from the perspective of personal and 
institutional independence.111 In noting the progress made since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Bank emphasizes constitutional and 
legal reforms. The new constitution of 1995 establishes the principle of an 
 
to the cancellation of the project. World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report, Peru Judicial Reform Project, 
Report No. 17137-PE (Oct. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Staff Appraisal Report: Peru 1997]; World Bank, 
Project Completion Note, Peru Judicial Reform Project, Report No. 20669 (June 30, 2000) [hereinafter 
Project Completion Note: Peru 2000]. Other projects include Venezuela (1997); Albania; Morocco; 
Armenia, Georgia, Peru (2004); Mexico; Macedonia; Romania; Russia (2007); and Kazakhstan. See 
infra Appendix I. 
 108.  Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 90, at 6. 
 109.  Id. at 7. 
 110.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of EURO 5.6 
million (US$ 5.3 Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Morocco for a Legal and Judicial Development 
Project, at 3, 5, Report No. 20457-MOR (May 18, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: 
Morocco 2000] (noting that “The Moroccan constitutional system is formally based on the principle of 
separation of powers and article 82 of the Constitution provides clearly for the independence of the 
judiciary” and “[e]nsuring the rule of law in Morocco requires a properly functioning legal and judicial 
system. This calls for enforcement of the country’s laws and regulations by a competent, transparent 
and independent judiciary.”). 
 111.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 8.6 
Million (US$ 11.4 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Armenia for a Judicial Reform Project, at 4-7, 
Report No. 20820-AM (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000] 
(noting a state of weak judicial independence under Soviet rule). 
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independent judiciary and a series of fundamental laws enacted during the 
period 1997–1999 provide a legislative framework for the establishment of 
a new independent judiciary.112 These “bold measures to develop and 
enhance judicial independence in Armenia” target the personal 
independence of judges (life tenure, appointment and removal from the 
office, compensation, safety, and immunity from prosecution) as well as 
institutional autonomy of the judiciary.113 
Regarding the personal independence of judges, the PAD explains the 
changes these laws made in areas of tenure, removal, disciplinary 
procedures and selection. These laws generally “conform to commonly 
recognized standards of judicial independence.”114 And yet they are far 
from perfect. Refinement in the areas of judicial qualification exams, the 
executive role in judicial nomination, disciplinary and removal procedures 
would improve Armenia’s de jure independence.115 In addition, it notes that 
the key to developing a truly independent judiciary, perceived as corrupt 
and partial, lies mainly in the implementation of the new laws.116  
With respect to institutional autonomy, the Bank notes the creation of 
a separate judiciary body (the Council of Court Chairmen (CCC)) to 
assume court administration responsibilities from the Ministry of Justice as 
“a significant development towards strengthening independence of the 
Armenian judiciary.”117 It also notes that “[not] only judges personally, but 
also the courts as institutions need protection from external pressure, and 
for courts to operate independently require appropriate funding—both 
sufficient and stable.”118 In this respect, the PAD describes specific 
measures including a separate budgetary item for the judiciary budget, a 
separate budget line item for each court, and the CCC’s exclusive authority 
 
 112.  Id. at 4. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 5. 
 115.  Id. at 10. As noted in the PAD for the second Armenia judicial reform project, constitutional 
reforms were approved in 2005 providing for the creation of a General Congress of Judges as the 
highest governing body of the judiciary and new procedures for composition of the Council of Justice 
which significantly reduced executive branch representation and power over judicial appointments and 
advancements. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 
15.2 Million (US$ 22.5 Million Equivalent) for a Second Judicial Reform Project in the Republic of 
Armenia, at 2, Report No. 38361-AM (Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 
2007]. 
 116.  Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111, at 9-10. 
 117.  Id. at 6. 
 118.  Id. 
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to prepare a budgetary proposal for the judiciary and administer the use of 
budgetary resources.119 
The Romania project is also explicit about the evaluation criteria. As 
the report states, “The degree of independence of the judiciary from the 
political authorities is traditionally assessed by: (i) the ways in which 
judges are appointed, transferred, promoted or dismissed; (ii) the level of 
judicial self-governance; and (iii) the level of budgetary autonomy.”120 In 
evaluating the constitutional and legal framework, the report notes that 
some provisions are aligned with European standards while others, 
specifically in the area of budgetary autonomy, fall short.121 
While the level of analysis may differ, these project documents 
recognize that “de jure” reforms are not sufficient to guarantee judicial 
independence. Indeed, several PADs observe the “gap” between the law or 
the norm and the practice. Some cite public opinion surveys showing that, 
despite better laws in the books, the judiciary is perceived as not 
independent from political authorities and pressures.122 This is a 
 
 119.  Id. Like Armenia, the Georgia PAD similarly observes a traditionally subordinate judiciary 
and describes the legal steps required to enhance judicial independence. These steps include the 
unification of jurisdiction (eliminating military jurisdiction); a new Judicial Council with 
responsibilities on administration (transferred from Ministry of Justice), new framework for 
qualification examinations for judges and salary increases. The report adds that the first rounds of 
examinations of judges were generally recognized in the country and overseas as transparent and fair. 
Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 3-4. 
 120.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of EURO 110.0 
Million (US$130.0 Million Equivalent) to Romania for a Judicial Reform Project, at 33, Report No. 
33987-RO (Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Romania 2005]. 
 121.  Id. See also World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of 
EURO 10.0 Million (US$ 12.4 Million Equivalent) to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for a 
Legal and Judicial Implementation and Institutional Support Project, at 10, Report No. 35506-MK 
(May 10, 2006) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Macedonia 2006] (noting that judicial 
independence in Macedonia is threatened by both political manipulation of judicial appointments and 
financial control); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of 
US$30 Million to the Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C. (Banobras) with the 
Guarantee of the United Mexican States for a State Judicial Modernization Supporting Access to 
Justice Project, at 66, 72-74, Report No. 27946-MX (June 4, 2004) [hereinafter Project Appraisal 
Document: Mexico 2004] (noting external and internal challenges to judicial independence); World 
Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$ 50 Million to the Russian 
Federation for a Judicial Reform Support Project, at 17-19, Report No. 36104-RU (Jan. 19, 2007) 
[hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007] (noting internal and external challenges to the 
judiciary). 
 122.  Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74, at 7-11 (2004) (noting that “[n]early 
90% of the enterprises and households surveyed believed that the Judiciary is not independent from 
political groups, nor that justice has been administered in a fair and equitable manner.”); World Bank, 
Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 10.0 Million (US$ 15 Million 
Equivalent) to the Republic of Honduras for a Judicial Branch Modernization Project, at 7, Report No. 
32128-HN (June 6, 2005) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Honduras 2005] (noting that 
“. . .[t]he overwhelming majority of respondents to a more recent survey stated that the Judiciary is 
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fundamental point. Indeed, the “gap” factor is highly relevant in 
determining government commitment to meaningful and sustainable reform 
and political risks for the projects. It reflects the degree of actual respect by 
public authorities for the independence of judges and the courts, an 
essential mark of a truly independent judiciary. Regardless of what the law 
in the books says, and declaratory statements made by government 
authorities, a record of political interference in the judiciary places such 
commitment in doubt. As previously discussed, the significance of 
ownership and commitment is affirmed repeatedly as one of the lessons 
learned from Bank operations. For example, the Yemen PAD states that 
“The lessons learned from these projects have underscored the importance 
of ownership and commitment at the highest level of government and of 
counterpart commitment. Experience indicates that local stakeholders need 
to be involved at the outset, both in studying the legal system and 
developing proposals for change.”123 In a similar fashion, the Morocco 
appraisal report affirms that: 
 
The lessons learned underscore the crucial importance of ownership and 
commitment at the highest level of government, as well as of the need 
for stability of relevant government policies and of leadership . . . strong 
and sustained support for legal and judicial reform by the country’s 
highest political authorities is crucial.124 
 
The Bank has emphasized that the most compelling evidence of 
borrower commitment to judicial reform is its actual “track record.”125 It is 
 
influenced by economic and political pressures.”); World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a 
Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 14.8 Million (US$21.6 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of 
Azerbaijan for a Judicial Modernization Project, at 91, Report No. 35447-AZ (June 5, 2006) 
[hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Azerbaijan 2006] (noting that “[p]ublic opinion tends to 
regard most judges as subject to political or economic influence, otherwise known as “telephone 
justice.”); Project Appraisal Document: Macedonia 2006, supra note 121, at 34 (noting that “[t]he 
independence of the judiciary is a principle laid down in the Constitution and the Law on Courts. 
However, there are some obstacles to the full independence of judges from political influence in 
practice.”); Project Appraisal Document: Romania 2005, supra note 120, at 33 (noting that the “legacy 
of subordination of the judiciary to state interests and to the party apparatus, and exploitation of the 
judiciary by the state as an official device to validate such prerogatives, is very strong and continues to 
cloud how judges and the court system are perceived.”); Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007, 
supra note 121, at 2 (noting that “[j]udicial independence, integrity and competence are widely 
perceived as unsatisfactory, by both the authorities and the public.”). 
 123.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Credit in 
the Amount of SDR 1.8 million equivalent to the Republic of Yemen for a Legal and Judicial 
Development Project, at 9 (June 28, 1999) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999]. 
 124.  Project Appraisal Document: Morocco 2000, supra note 110, at 19. 
 125.  Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 10. 
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not clear, however, whether Bank practice recognizes this reality. In those 
operations with a stronger focus on judicial independence, the evidence 
consists mostly of structural measures (i.e. constitutional and legal norms, 
organizational structures).126 In other projects, the proof of government 
commitment and ownership is largely of a formal and technical nature.127 
Project documents mainly refer to declaratory statements of support for the 
projects by the judiciary and other government leaders; initiation of project 
activities of a technical nature; formation of technical teams, inter-agency 
groups and coordinating commissions; and even the request for funding 
from the Bank.128 
Concerns about political infringements on judicial independence 
surface in some operations as either explicit or implicit project risks or 
assumptions. In any event, it is hard to find coherence and consistency in 
whether, and how, these risks are identified and qualified. The Kazakhstan 
PAD explains that one of the risks is that “judicial independence is 
impeded upon and judicial role in administration and education is 
minimized.”129 Further, the Bank recognizes that the project is 
“implemented in a highly political environment, affecting the role of the 
state, both internally—the relation between the executive, the legislature 
and the judiciary—as externally, in its relation with society at large.”130 The 
 
 126.  See World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Credit in the Amount 
of US $ 13.33 million (SDR 9.87 Million Credit) to Georgia for a Judicial Reform Project, at 14 (May 
17, 2007) [hereinafter Georgia Judicial Reform 2007]; Staff Appraisal Report: Peru 1997, supra note 
107; Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111; Project Completion Note, Peru 
Judicial Reform Project, supra note 107; World Bank, Sudan Multi Donor Trust Fund, Final Project 
Proposal, The Rule of Law Sector Capacity Building of the Sudan Judiciary, at 6-8 (Feb. 28 2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 Sudan Capacity]. 
 127.  Project Appraisal Document: El Salvador 2002, supra note 105, at 19. 
 128.  E.g., id. at 19 (referencing to government requests for donor financing, the approval of the 
project by Supreme Court, new technical team and assignment of technical staff to the project and 
declaration of support of project by executive branch); Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999, 
supra note 123 (referencing to declaration by council of ministers, a workshop with judiciary 
representatives, compilation of legislation, establishment of a legal reform center and request for World 
Bank financial assistance of the project); Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76 
(referencing to participation of stakeholders, support by executive and legislative branches, assumption 
by Council of Justice of control of the reform process, preparation of master plan for court 
administration and case management and declaration by President that judicial reform is essential to the 
country’s development). 
 129.  Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 13. 
 130.  Id. See also Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999, supra note 123, at 12  (identifying the 
high project risk that “government commitment to supporting an objective and independent judiciary 
may falter due to budgetary constraints; changes in high-level ministerial staffing or pressure from 
entrenched interests”); Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 90, at 23 (project risk is 
“[i]nformal norms of behavior within the legal and judicial system do not allow new judicial structures 
and laws to be applied as laid out in the Albania Constitution and new organic laws”); Project 
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Azerbaijan PAD states that there is a risk to “judicial independence and 
ethics.”131 In the Russia PAD, the Bank admits that “Political risks are 
unavoidable. These arise from the complex interplay and sometimes 
conflicting agendas of major actors: different elements of the judiciary, the 
executive and the legislature. Such conflicts may be manifested in inter-
agency turf battles, coordination gridlocks, backtracking on reforms, and 
delays in project design and implementation.”132 Some PADs include 
project assumptions that courts function independently or the presence of a 
supportive political environment.133 In other cases, political interference is 
arguably implicit in some of the stated risks. Such PADs refer to resistance 
from interest groups, government transitions or political pressures.134 
2. How Is Judicial Independence Addressed in the Design of the 
Projects? 
The fact that a project has judicial independence as an explicit 
objective does not provide much guidance. As we saw before, judicial 
independence is an explicit objective in only a few projects. This does not 
appear to signify any distinctive element common to all of these projects. 
In fact, there is no special project component or activity and one finds 
similar judicial reform elements in other projects. Regarding policy 
conditions, it is hard to say if there is any particular difference based on the 
publicly available information. In the case of the Peru (1997) project, 
progress on restoring judicial tenure was a key policy condition in the 
project.135 And it was for reasons of breach with this policy condition that 
the project was cancelled.136 
 
Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 15 (critical assumption is a supportive political 
environment); Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111, at 29 (risk is that “[t]he 
judiciary does not overcome administrative (MOJ) and financial (Ministry of Finance and Economy) 
control of the executive branch.”). 
 131.  Project Appraisal Document: Azerbaijan 2006, supra note 122, at 26. 
 132.  Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007, supra note 121, at 9. 
 133.  See Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 12; see also Project 
Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 15. 
 134.  See, e.g., World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of 
US$21.9 Million to the Republic of the Philippines for a Judicial Reform Support Project, at 21, Report 
No. 25504 (Jul. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Project Appraisal Document: Philippines 2003] (“change in 
Supreme Court and hence reform leadership” and “resistance from interest groups that could oppose 
reforms”); Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74, at 29  (explaining that resistance 
from special interests and changes in senior officials may prevent or reverse advances in creating a 
client-oriented Judiciary and political pressures may limit the ability of sector agencies to move forward 
with the reform agenda). 
 135.  BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, supra note 27. 
 136.  See Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74, at 9; BUILDING ON QUICKSAND, 
supra note 27. 
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A more relevant distinction, for purposes of the question under 
consideration, is the distinction the Bank draws between “structural 
independence” and “operational independence” or “independence in 
practice.” The first one refers to the constitutional empowerment of the 
judiciary to self-governance and is predicated on formal rules and 
structures. Many of the projects support such empowerment or formal 
autonomy. This is evidenced in the establishment and institutional 
strengthening of independent bodies (i.e. judicial councils) for judicial 
selection and administration. The second concerns the capacity of the 
judiciary to manage and administer its own resources. As we noted in the 
previous section, to achieve independence in practice, judges need the 
necessary tools such as education, safety, reasonable working conditions 
and salaries, legal information and effective court and case management 
procedures. Both types of independence are addressed in the projects 
though “operational independence” appears to take precedence. 
Based on the above distinctions, one may argue that most, if not all, of 
the project designs address judicial independence to some extent. Some 
projects explicitly claim that their respective interventions indirectly help to 
strengthen judicial independence. In the Ecuador SAR, the Bank notes: 
 
The project would aim at strengthening the judiciary in the processing of 
cases in an efficient and fair manner—that is, providing judges and court 
personnel with new case management techniques, information 
technology and mediation procedures which will allow cases to be 
resolved in an efficient and effective manner as well as improving access 
to justice and the quality of judicial training. Through these components, 
the judiciary should experience efficiency gains and improvements in the 
quality of service delivered to the public—both of which are elements 
contributing to the independence of the judiciary.137 
 
Other projects, as we saw, claim that they build judicial independence 
in the sense of “independence in practice” or operational independence. 
However, these institutional interventions do not directly address the 
underlying cultural and moral forces and incentives underlying the gap 
 
 137.  Staff Appraisal Report: Ecuador 1996, supra note 106, at 21; see also Project Appraisal 
Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 13-14. (“Extensive judicial training and implementation 
of new court and case management techniques are helping to increase the quality, transparency, and 
accountability of the courts, and may lead to a more independent judiciary, with significant political 
consequences”); Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 108, at 18 (“Fundamental 
democratic principles, such as the independence of the judiciary . . . are still new concepts in 
Albania . . . . The Project will, however, involve staff of benefiting institutions in training programs 
which, it is anticipated, will at least indirectly, have a positive impact.”). 
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between formal rules and institutions, one on side, and the actual practices 
and behaviors inconsistent with values of independence and impartiality. 
3. How Do the Bank’s Internal Evaluations Deal with Judicial 
Independence? 
The Bank has issued Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) for 
twenty projects and Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPARs) for 
six projects.138 The issue of judicial independence figures quite prominently 
in the above reports. From a review of these reports, the following 
observations emerge. 
First, judicial independence is strategically relevant to all judicial 
reform projects and must be taken into account at the time of project 
conception and appraisal. Failure to do so is a “strategic mistake,” as was 
concluded in the Bangladesh project.139 It appears that implementation of 
the Bangladesh project was seriously undermined by the judiciary’s 
vulnerabilities to political intrusion.140 The Bank project team disregarded 
such vulnerabilities and this proved fatal.141 Indeed, the reforms pursued by 
the project, primarily new case management models, were not 
sustainable.142 The project showed “clear evidence how insufficient 
autonomy, if not addressed—e.g. through the design or policy dialogue—
could endanger the reforms.”143 Several other ICRs recognize the relevance 
of judicial independence to project success.144 
 
 138.  THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, supra note 59. 
 139.  World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Credit in the Amount of 
SDR 23.6 Million (US$ 30.6 Million Equivalent) To the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for a Legal 
and Judicial Capacity Building Project, at 15, Report No. ICR00001200 (May 14, 2010) [hereinafter 
Implementation Completion: Bangladesh 2010]. 
 140.  Id. at 24. 
 141.  Id. at 15. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 23. 
 144.  See World Bank, Implementation Completion Report on a Loan in the Amount of US $5 
Million to the Republic of Argentina for a Model Court Development Project, Report No. 35356, at 16-
17 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Implementation Completion Report: Argentina 2006] (noting the failure 
to give proper consideration of the sector’s institutional context and assurances of adequate 
independence for the judiciary), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/07/24/000112742_20060724121459/Rendered/PDF/353560corrig
endum.pdf; Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80, at 3 (noting the direct 
relationship between measures to strengthen judicial independence and project success); World Bank, 
Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of US$2.49 Million to the West Bank and 
Gaza for a Legal Development Project, Report No. 29066, at 12 (June 9, 2004) [hereinafter 
Implementation Completion Report: West Bank & Gaza 2004] (noting that “[t]o have the maximum 
impact, technical reform initiatives should ideally be planned to complement political progress on 
creation of the legal and political foundation for reform initiatives”). 
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Second, when taking into account judicial independence, it is not 
enough to examine the law in the books but one must appraise the law in 
practice. The Bangladesh ICR is clear on this point. On speaking about the 
failure to adequately assess judicial independence, the report points out 
that: “It should have been apparent at the conception of the project that 
constitutional restrains on undue influence of the executive power over 
judiciary were not working in practice. Arbitrary judicial appointments and 
reassignments are just one example of the vulnerabilities of the 
Bangladeshi judiciary.”145 Additional infringements on judicial 
independence included low salaries and executive control of judicial 
removals. Other ICRs also stress the importance of evaluating the de facto 
government commitment to reform.146 
Lastly, strengthening judicial independence requires a focus on 
political attitudes and behavior. Judicial independence was one objective of 
the Georgia project.147 However, the ICR found that this project was 
properly designed to address technical aspects of judicial effectiveness and 
efficiency only; it did not deal with the political complexities of 
strengthening judicial independence.148 None of the project outputs directly 
advanced judicial independence but rather “provided only indirect support 
for the strengthening of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other branches of 
government by strengthening the capacity of the judiciary for self-
governance and providing the tools for improved operational 
performance.”149 While Georgia had enacted constitutional safeguards to 
protect judicial independence, the ICR Bank noted that such amendments 
were insufficient in a climate of weak political will.150 The PPAR 
confirmed this concluding that the project components were “unlikely to 
lead to judicial independence.”151 
 
 145.  Implementation Completion: Bangladesh 2010, supra note 139, at 21. 
 146.  See Implementation Completion Report: West Bank & Gaza 2004, supra note 144, at 8 
(“[T]here was a serious lack of [Palestinian Authority] commitment to judicial reform.”); World Bank, 
Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of SDR 6.6 Million to Albania for a 
Legal and Judicial Reform Project, at 19, Report No. 35351 (June 12, 2006) (“[t]his project has shown 
that there are a variety of basic institution building interventions that can support legal and judicial 
development. However, close attention needs to be paid to how these interventions impact and depend 
on the balance of power between the executive and the judiciary.”). 
 147.  Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76, at 2-3 (explaining that the project 
would “assist in the development of an independent and professional judiciary, committed to high 
standards of judicial ethics and capable of efficient, effective dispute resolution.”). 
 148.  Georgia Judicial Reform 2007, supra note 126, at 12. 
 149.  See id. at 13. 
 150.  See id. at 12. 
 151.  Project Performance Assessment Report, Georgia Judicial Reform Project, Structural 
Adjustment Credit, Reform Support Credit, Report No. 46832, at 6 (Dec. 29, 2008).  In an interesting 
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III. JUDICIAL REFORM: REFLECTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Our previous analysis shows that the Bank’s strategy on judicial 
reform prioritizes the independence of judges, with particular and special 
concern for independence from the political branches. The Bank’s actual 
practice, however, demonstrates that the issue of political interference in 
the judicial process, though extremely relevant, is not properly assessed 
and its underlying cultural and moral dimension is marginalized. Indeed, 
there is quite a degree of incoherence and inconsistency in how the Bank 
evaluates the degree of judicial autonomy. The evidence at times is 
confined to the existence of rules, regardless of their enforcement and 
societal support. Further, the Bank not only falls short in evaluating 
relevant evidence of political intrusion, but also underestimates the 
dimension of personal and cultural values in such corrupt behavior. Indeed, 
the project portfolio largely targets structural and operational deficiencies 
to address judicial independence. 
Let us now turn to these two issues in more detail: the relevant 
evidence of judicial independence and the culture dimension of judicial 
independence. As I consider these issues, I am fully aware of the 
challenges in dealing with such a complex, multifaceted and sensitive 
subject. Judicial independence is “a slippery concept, difficult to define let 
alone to measure.”152 Indeed, there are no single criteria to evaluate its 
presence or absence. It exists in degrees throughout the world and there are 
differing views on its foundation. At the same time, let me remind the 
reader that the focus of this article is on the independence of judges and the 
courts from interference by political authorities. It is one dimension of 
judicial independence, albeit a critical one. Indeed, “Government poses 
perhaps the most serious threat to judicial independence for two reasons: it 
has a potential interest in the outcome of myriad cases, and it has so much 
potential power over judges.”153 
 
footnote, the report expanded on the necessary changes to achieve judicial independence, “[t]o have 
independent judges a society must create the political and economic incentives to achieve that result, 
but the project did not deal with these critical factors. For judicial independence the fundamental 
positive question would be: ‘Under what circumstances will politicians maintain judges who are 
independent from themselves?’” Id. at 5 n.2 (citing J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, 
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 4 (2003)). 
 152.  Julio Rios Figueroa, Judicial Independence: Definition, Measurement, and Its Effects on 
Corruption. An Analysis of Latin America 2 (2006), available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/~jrf246/ 
Papers/PhD%20Diss%20JRF.pdf. 
 153.  Matthew Stephenson, Brief, Judicial Independence: What It Is, How It Can Be Measured, 
Why It Occurs, WORLD BANK, at 1, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/ 
Resources/JudicialIndependence.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). 
While political interference is the focus of this article, I fully recognize that interference may come 
from other outside sources. Further, I also recognize that judicial independence in a broad sense is also 
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A. The Relevant Evidence of Judicial Independence 
To our first question: how does the Bank assess the degree of judicial 
autonomy? What is the relevant evidence it looks for? As previously 
discussed, the Bank has had opportunities to evaluate the approach taken in 
certain projects towards political intrusion in the judiciary. In particular, it 
was a key concern in the evaluation of the Bangladesh project. Noting the 
strategic relevance of judicial independence, the ICR highlighted the 
drastic consequences of disregarding evidence on political interference 
with judicial autonomy. In fact, such project showed “clear evidence how 
insufficient autonomy, if not addressed—e.g. through the design or policy 
dialogue—could endanger the reforms.”154 
The previous section has shown that the Bangladesh project is not the 
only operation where the Bank has failed to take into account political 
interference. In most projects, however, there is documentary evidence 
showing that the Bank took into account judicial independence. Yet the 
approach that emerges is not consistent, coherent or comprehensive. The 
ICR noted that there was “clear evidence on insufficient autonomy.”155 
However, it did not suggest or refer to any guidelines on how to go about 
this matter. 
As its standard practice, the Bank should gather and evaluate 
comprehensive evidence, dealing with both de jure and de facto judicial 
independence. The Bank must be able to grasp how serious this type of 
corruption is and its potential adverse impact on any intervention. 
Otherwise, it potentially compromises the Bank’s fiduciary obligations and 
its concern for aid effectiveness. A de jure analysis would be a logical 
starting point. This requires a careful and thorough review of all relevant 
rules, processes and institutions designed to protect judicial independence. 
This does not appear to be standard practice in all projects. A failure to 
fully assess the de jure judicial independence and the implications for the 
project was noted in the Guatemala ICR as it related to the reduced tenure 
of Supreme Court and appellate judges.156 
 
a function of the judge’s behavior. Judicial independence is important as a means towards judicial 
impartiality, which is essential to good justice.  See USAID, Guidance for Promoting Judicial 
Independence and Impartiality, at 6 (2002) available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_ 
and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf. 
 154.  Implementation Completion: Bangladesh 2010, supra note 139, at 24. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See Clustered PPAR 2010, supra note 70, at 13; World Bank, Clustered Project Performance 
Assessment Report for the Guatemala Judicial Reform Project, Report No. ICR0000623 (Mar. 10, 
2008). 
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The de jure review, however, is clearly inadequate on its own. While 
structural safeguards are important, they do not in and of themselves ensure 
judicial independence. As the Bank noted in the Georgia ICR: “Tackling 
independence head on requires more than the constitutional reforms, it 
requires the focus and will of the political leadership.”157 Formal guarantees 
of judicial independence are ignored or manipulated in many, if not most, 
countries. Thus it is critical to evaluate the de facto conditions.158 To what 
extent are the formal rules working in practice? What is the relevant 
behavior of political authorities? 
There appears to be no consistent and coherent gathering of the de 
facto evidence, let alone analysis of its underlying causes. This would 
include factual evidence on, among other things, the actual fairness in the 
judicial appointment process (including timing of filling judicial 
vacancies), the extent to which judges render decisions against the 
government, the extent to which the executive and legislative authorities 
comply with and enforce judicial decisions, how often are judges changed, 
the development of actual salaries and budgets, and the extent to which 
jurisdiction of the courts is usurped by the executive and legislative 
authorities. Such evidence should be consistently gathered, appraised and 
explicitly taken into account when assessing government commitment and 
project risks.159 
I recognize that there are certainly technical challenges with the de 
facto assessments. This requires certain tools and methodologies. Several 
efforts and attempts have been made in this regard which may guide the 
Bank in developing its standard practice.160 The most significant challenge, 
 
 157.  Georgia Judicial Reform 2007, supra note 126, at 14. 
 158.  Some scholars argue that it is misleading to distinguish between de facto and de jure “judicial 
independence” at the conceptual level. In their view, “[j]udicial independence is best thought of as 
either autonomy or power, whereas institutions like fixed tenure, budgetary autonomy, and judicial 
councils are best thought of as rules designed to promote autonomy or power. They do not, strictly 
speaking, reflect judicial independence.” Julio Rios-Figueroa & Jeffrey Staton, Unpacking the Rule of 
Law: A Review of Judicial Independence Measures, 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 
Nov. 20-21, 2009, at 14 (Apr. 26, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434234. 
 159.  It is interesting to note that this is a type of “de facto” evidence is used by the World Bank to 
support the notion that judicial independence is very developed. See World Bank, Project Appraisal 
Document on a Proposed Adaptable Program Loan in the Amount of US$20 Million to the Republic of 
Colombia for a Justice Services Strengthening Project – Phase I (APLI) in Support of the First Phase of 
the Justice Services Strengthening Program, at 31, Report No. 47338-CO (Nov. 6, 2009) [hereinafter 
Project Appraisal Document: Colombia 2009] (noting complaints that Constitutional Court has been 
too ready to overrule government programs). 
 160.  See Methodology FREEDOM HOUSE,  http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351& 
ana_page=341&year=2008 (last  visited Nov. 9, 2011); Rios-Figueroa & Staton, supra note 158, at 14; 
Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence 
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however, may be of a different nature. The de facto evidence will make it 
more difficult to contend that there is sufficient political commitment to 
meaningful judicial reform. This should impact the ability and willingness 
of the Bank to make loans for judicial reform, particularly large operations. 
If the record, which the Bank would need to produce and disclose, shows 
serious manipulation of the judicial process by political authorities, it 
would be much harder to support large investments in court administration 
and infrastructure. I am not arguing that the Bank never takes into account 
political interference in its judicial reform operations. What I am arguing is 
that there needs to be a clear set of policies and procedures of doing so. 
B. The Cultural Dimension of Judicial Independence 
The second question addressing the problem of “insufficient 
autonomy” is: How do we reduce the intrusion by political authorities? 
This begs an additional inquiry: What will motivate political leaders to 
respect the independence and impartiality of the judicial process? 
The behavior in question is of a corrupt nature. Politicians abuse their 
authority and influence to advance narrow and selfish interests at the 
expense of the public good. Indeed, political interference in the judicial 
process is a form of judicial corruption. Transparency International (TI) 
defines judicial corruption as “any inappropriate influence on the 
impartiality of the judicial process by any actor within the court system.”161 
Further, together with bribery, TI deems political interference in the 
judicial process as the worst kind of judicial corruption.162 Again, political 
interference is expressed through threats, intimidation and bribery of judges 
in addition to the manipulation of judicial appointments, salaries and 
conditions of service. 
The Bank seeks to address the problem of corruption mainly through 
reforms in the institutional and incentive framework.163 As the judicial 
reform portfolio shows, these reforms include a menu of supply and 
demand side measures. They mainly target organizational arrangements 
and capabilities in justice institutions as well as building transparency and 
external accountability. As discussed in the previous section, judicial 
independence is mainly addressed through structural and operational 
 
Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 502-08 (2003) (listing twenty de iure and de 
facto indicators). 
 161.  TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT xxi (2007). 
 162. See id. 
 163.  See generally World Bank, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance 
and Anticorruption (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTOR 
ANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/GACIP.pdf. 
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interventions. Yet despite these efforts, there generally is limited impact on 
judicial independence and impartiality. There is little or no change in the 
public’s perception of judges partial to political pressures. The Bank’s 
institutional interventions are not producing the desired outcomes. 
Judicial institutions in a society cannot be viewed in isolation from its 
broader cultural context and values. There is little doubt that institutional 
reforms, as those supported by the Bank, are essential to achieve an 
independent and impartial judiciary. Indeed, changes in the rules and 
structures that govern the appointment, promotion, performance and 
removal of judges are necessary in most settings to ensure greater judicial 
autonomy and insulation from political as well as other undue pressures 
and influences. Building institutional capabilities, whether in the 
management of human resources, budgets or otherwise, is also instrumental 
for the effective implementation of such new structures and rules as well as 
the improvement of overall judicial performance. Yet, at a deeper level, the 
problem of weak judicial independence in a society may stem from deeper 
cultural roots.164 Breaches of judicial independence and impartiality are not 
merely an outgrowth of inadequate laws, poor institutional design, weak 
institutional capabilities, or even insufficient monitoring and 
accountability. The institutional environment in a society reflects its 
cultural values and attitudes. As one author puts it, “culture is the mother, 
institutions are the children.”165 New rules and structures and improved 
institutional capabilities and accountability, while absolutely necessary for 
building a more independent and impartial judiciary, are certainly not 
sufficient if society lacks a foundation of strong cultural values of respect 
for the rule of law. 
In many social settings, regardless of what formal rules prescribe, the 
cultural values and practices clash with principles of judicial independence 
and impartiality. Using political power and influence to promote favoritism 
for personal or political connections is often perceived as acceptable and 
legitimate. This dysfunctional behavior, however, is not always limited to 
the political elite. While leaders bear much of the responsibility, the 
problem often cuts across all segments and sectors in society. While we 
 
 164.  See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM  89 (1999); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Causes and Consequences of 
Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?, in AN INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 17-18, (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Edward Elgar eds., 
2006). 
 165.  See Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?, in 
CULTURE MATTERS, HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 75 (Lawrence Harrison & Samuel 
Huntington eds., 2000). 
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need to guard against the temptation to stereotype and oversimplify the 
behaviors of communities and individuals, there may be a high degree of 
complicity among the citizenry. In fact, “doing favors for family and 
friends is such an ingrained behavior in many cultures that magistrates do 
not often believe it affects their role as impartial arbiters.”166 In many 
societies, these practices are woven into the fabric of everyday life of 
ordinary citizens. Relatives and friends expect favoritism and partiality 
from those with authority and influence, whether a political leader, police 
officer, or teacher. In the words of a Nigerian political leader, “Who gets 
to . . . a position of power and then refuses to help his people?”167 
These dysfunctional behaviors appear to permeate societies with weak 
values of common good and public interest. Distinctions between one’s 
private and public roles are not that clear. Despite the existence of adequate 
structures, rules and institutional capacity, such societies face formidable 
challenges in establishing a modern judiciary with competent judges who 
are expected to act impartially. It is not surprising thus that the public 
perceives in such societies that that there is no rule of law. Carlos Montaner 
put it well as he described a culture of lawlessness prevailing in Latin 
America. As he explains, “a large percentage of Latin Americans either 
nurture or tolerate relationships in which personal loyalty is rewarded and 
merit is substantially ignored. In Latin American culture, loyalty rarely 
extends beyond the circle of friends and family. Thus the public sector is 
profoundly mistrusted and the notion of the common good is very 
weak . . . .”168 The author further affirms that true power in Latin America 
resides in the ability to operate above the law.169 What Montaner says about 
Latin America is also a reality in other countries and regions around the 
world. 
The Bank needs to give greater emphasis to the role of culture in its 
work on judicial reform. While its framework for judicial reform does 
recognize the relevance of cultural factors, the Bank has no system for 
actually identifying and addressing the relevant cultural issues. Impartial 
justice will not come about primarily through more structural and 
operational independence measures. Moral and ethical values are 
 
 166.  See Mary Noel Pepys, Justice System, in FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
STRATEGIES AND ANALYSIS 18 (Bertram I. Spector ed., 2005) . 
 167.  See Daniel Jordan Smith, The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria, 
in CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 290 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See Carlos Alberto Montaner, Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin America, in 
CULTURE MATTERS, HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 57-58 (Lawrence Harrison & Samuel 
Huntington eds., 2000). 
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fundamental incentives for independent and impartial justice. Thus “any 
approach to corruption that fails to reckon with its moral aspect will be 
both descriptively and programmatically inadequate.”170 Reforms must 
focus more on cultural and ethical values and attitudes. Intrinsic 
motivations deserve greater attention. We should strive for societies where 
political leaders, and citizens alike, respect independence and impartiality, 
in other words respect the law, because it is the right thing to do, not just 
because of possible exposure and being afraid of being caught. 
If large segments of society do not value and care enough, political 
intrusion, or any other undue influence, in the judicial process will not 
diminish. In a welcomed development, the Bank, as other development 
agencies, has oriented its reform efforts to include greater civil society 
participation and accountability. Indeed, strengthening civil society has 
become a common mantra in programs and projects seeking to make 
governments more accountable. These reform efforts focus on the impact 
that entities outside government can have, working in support of citizen’s 
demand for better public institutions. Specific measures involve stronger 
NGOs as watchdogs, media capacity and empowering citizens. This 
growing focus on demand is reflected in the Bank’s judicial reform 
operations. Measures are taken to develop a robust civil society by 
increasing access to information and enabling the public to monitor and 
challenge the government when necessary. Projects support greater 
participation of citizens mainly through awareness campaigns, public 
information and education on legal rights and the judiciary and 
accountability mechanisms. 
There is no doubt that a more informed and empowered citizenry with 
greater oversight is key to better government and justice institutions. We 
know that corruption flourishes when the public is poorly informed, 
apathetic, tolerant or so politically weak as to be unable to protest. 
However, is the problem primarily one of a poorly informed, apathetic or 
resigned public? Or is it that values of independence and impartiality are 
widely lacking in society? The focus on transparency and accountability 
places more emphasis on institutional reforms and external incentives while 
marginalizing the dimension of personal and social values as fundamental 
incentives for decision-making. Civil society oversight will be ineffective if 
large segments of the public are not outraged by these corrupt behaviors 
but rather see them as legitimate and acceptable. Indeed, citizens will not 
care to engage and demand accountability from political leaders and judges 
 
 170.  Laura S. Underkuffler, Defining Corruption: Implications for Action, in CORRUPTION, 
GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 37 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009). 
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if they are active participants in such undesirable practices. What is worse, 
generations of children and youth, the future leaders in these societies, 
come to believe that fairness and personal merit do not count and that it is 
fine to show partiality and favoritism. This is one of the most fundamental 
parts of the problem. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bank’s approach to judicial independence, largely shared by other 
development agencies, is not producing the desired outcomes. In fact, 
Transparency International sadly admits that “despite several decades of 
reform efforts and international instruments protecting judicial 
independence, judges and court personnel around the world continue to 
face pressure to rule in favor of powerful political or economic entities, 
rather than according to the law.”171 These findings urgently demand a 
reexamination of the presuppositions and strategies privileged so far. There 
is a need to move beyond discussions about structural independence and 
operational independence. It may be more operationally expedient for the 
Bank to shy away from deeper inquiry about the degree and underlying 
cultural determinants of political intrusiveness in the judicial process and to 
prefer a focus on institutional capacity weaknesses. Yet, there is little or no 
lasting impact and aid effectiveness is in doubt. 
Future projects must include rigorous evidence gathering on the actual 
status of a country’s judiciary and political players as shown in practice, 
not simply relying on de jure and declarative factors. Ownership of judicial 
reform projects, and commitment to them, must be demonstrated by a track 
record of positive action over words and in accordance with a clear set of 
criteria and guidelines as Bank policy. 
As the Bank moves forward in its judicial reform activities, this article 
suggests that it review certain blind spots in how it evaluates and addresses 
the respect for judicial independence by political authorities. The Bank 
needs a stronger and deeper focus on the cultural determinants of the 
weaknesses in the rule of law and judicial independence suffered by 
societies. It needs to conduct broader and deeper diagnostic work, taking 
into account the underlying cultural forces of endemic political intrusion in 
the judiciary. This includes exploring and discovering the relationships 
among these cultural factors, low levels of trust and poor judicial outcomes. 
Reform efforts should place greater emphasis on societal values and 
attitudes and less on new structures and operational capabilities. 
 
 171. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 161, at xxii–xxiii. 
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This requires new approaches and a long-term effort and commitment. 
It will likely demand intense and greater educational efforts to instill in 
society, especially the younger generations, the values underpinning the 
rule of law and judicial independence and impartiality and their 
significance to a better society. In the long run, the fundamental willingness 
to uphold and defend these values will likely be the strongest catalyst for 
change. Cultural independence matters. 
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APPENDIX 1: Table of Bank Stand-Alone Judicial Reform Projects172 
 
Venezuela Judicial 
Infrastructure 
Project (1992)173 
Approved: Aug. 1992 
Closed: Oct. 2002 
Project Cost: 
US $60 million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $30 
million  
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
 
Improve Venezuela’s enabling environment for private 
sector development and reduce both the private and social costs 
of justice. It would: (a) improve efficiency in the allocation of 
resources within the judiciary; (b) increase courtroom 
productivity and efficiency; and (c) reduce 
the private sector costs of dispute resolution. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Judicial administration (strengthen the planning, budgeting, 
and management capacity of the Judicial Council, including 
the design and implementation of an information system to 
provide quantifiable performance indicators) 
(b) Courtroom administration (improve courtroom productivity 
and efficiency through reorganization and streamlining 
courtroom administrative procedures, including automation 
of caseload and courtroom management)  
(c) Judicial training (strengthen the administrative capacity and 
specialized legal knowledge of court personnel, including 
knowledge pertinent to commercial and business litigation, 
by strengthening the capacity of the Judicial School to design 
and deliver training)  
(d) Physical infrastructure (rehabilitate existing and construct 
new courtroom facilities) 
Bolivian Judicial 
Reform Project 
(1995)174 
Approved: April 1995 
Closed: March 2000 
Project Cost: 
US $ 12.75 
million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $11 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve the quality and effectiveness of civil justice 
administration, strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary to provide 
judicial services, and of the Ministry of Justice to prepare, 
review, and implement laws and programs related to the 
country’s constitutional, judicial, economic, and social reforms. 
 
 172.  All of the figures and text herein are quoted/drawn from the respective Bank project 
documents, including staff appraisal reports, project appraisal documents, implementation completion 
reports and project performance assessment reports, and the World Bank, Initiatives in Justice Reform.  
See, e.g., WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5. 
 173.  Staff Appraisal Report: Venezuela 1992, supra note 28; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 86. 
 174.  Staff Appraisal Report: Bolivia 1995, supra note 64; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE 
REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 72. 
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Project 
Components  
The Judiciary:  
(a) Judicial process reforms (judicial process policies, training, 
information systems and courtroom administration)  
(b)  Human resource management (judicial career system, 
judicial training program, judicial ethics program) 
(c) Institutional strengthening 
(d)  Judicial development fund 
 
The Ministry of Justice:  
(a) Implementation of Constitutional reforms on judicial matters 
(b) Alternative dispute resolution 
(c)  Legislative reforms 
(d) Institutional strengthening  
 
Project Coordination Unit 
Ecuador Judicial 
Reform Project 
(1996)175 
Approved: July 1996 
Closed: Nov. 2002 
Project Cost: 
US $12.12 
million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $10.7 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve the capacity of the judicial system by strengthening the 
administration of justice. Specifically, the proposed project aims 
at:  
(a) increasing efficiency, effectiveness and transparency in the 
judicial process by improving case administration 
procedures;  
(b) improving the infrastructure;  
(c) expanding the use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms within the court system;  
(d)  improving the access to justice by the public and women in 
particular; and  
(e) improving court reform and research and legal education.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Case administration and information support 
(b) Alternative dispute resolution (mediation centers and 
training) 
(c) Program for law and justice (including support for civil 
society activities, court innovation, a professional 
development program, a legal education study, evaluation of 
the mediation centers, and legal services for the poor) 
(d) Remodeling and development of infrastructure  
(e) Project coordination unit 
West Bank and 
Gaza Legal 
Approved: June 1997 
Closed: June 2004 
Project Cost: 
US $14.92 
Credit 
Amount: 
 
 175.  Clustered PPAR 2010, supra note 70, at 7; Staff Appraisal Report: Ecuador 1996, supra note 
106; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5. 
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Development 
Project (1997)176 
million  US $5.5 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Assist the Palestinian Authority in (a) starting the process of 
putting in place a legal framework adequate to support a modern 
market economy and encourage the growth of the private sector; 
and (b) increasing the efficiency and predictability of the judicial 
process 
Project 
Components 
(a) Unification and development of legislation  
(b) Court administration  
(c) Judicial training  
(d) Alternative dispute resolution  
(e) Legal information 
Peru Judicial 
Reform Project 
(1997)177 
Approved: Oct. 1997 
Cancelled: Sept. 1998 
Project Cost: 
US $31.6 million  
Loan 
Amount: 
US $22.5 
million 
loan 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Assist Peru in improving the performance of its justice system by 
enhancing, under the framework and terms of its sector strategy 
in the policy letter, its access, quality, independence, efficiency, 
and integrity. The specific objectives are to: 
(a) modernize the administrative structure and operation of the 
Judiciary; 
(b) improve the overall performance in civil and labor courts in 
the selected districts; 
(c) strengthen the CNM and consolidate and improve its merit-
based system of appointment, advancement and removal of 
magistrates;  
(d) strengthen the AM and enhance the professional competence 
of civil and labor judges in the selected districts; 
(e) strengthen OCMA’s disciplinary system to enhance 
accountability and integrity of judges;  
(f) develop and strengthen alternative dispute resolution 
methods; 
(g) support the institutional development of the newly 
established Office of Public Defender; and  
(h) strengthen the capacity of civil society to analyze, monitor 
and demand judicial performance.
Project 
Components 
(a) Administration of justice (modernizing administrative 
apparatus of judiciary and courtroom performance 
improvements) 
 
 176.  Implementation Completion Report: West Bank & Gaza 2004, supra note 144. 
 177.  Staff Appraisal Report: Peru 1997, supra note 107; Project Completion Note: Peru 2000, 
supra note 107. 
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(b) Judicial selection, evaluation, and training  
(c) Access to justice (justices of peace, public defender, civil 
society) 
(d) Project management and administration 
Venezuela Supreme 
Court 
Modernization 
Project (1997)178 
Approved: Dec. 1997 
Closed: June 2001 
Project Cost:  
US $7.3 million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $4.7 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve the performance of the Supreme Court in terms of 
transparency, efficiency of administration and case management, 
and timeliness of decisions, through development of new work 
methods, attitudes, and behaviors that would have a 
demonstration effect in leading further judicial reform.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Capacity building in communications, policy research, and 
quality assurance 
(b) Caseload administration 
(c) Supreme Court decisions’ dissemination  
(e) Administration and management support 
Argentina Reform 
of Justice Project 
(1999)179 
Approved: April 1998 
Closed: Sept. 2005 
Project cost:  
US $6.95 million 
Loan 
amount: 
US $5 
million  
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Identify, establish, and evaluate conditions that support the 
realization of judicial administrative reform and form part of an 
overall legal and judicial reform program.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Court and case management in pilot courts (judicial 
administration and backlog delay reduction) 
(b) Training  
(c) Evaluation and dissemination of information on pilot courts 
(d) Project management 
Kazakhstan Legal 
Reform Project 
(1999)180 
Approved: May 1999 
Cancelled: Oct. 2003 
Project Cost:  
US $18.5 million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $16.5 
million  
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Contribute to the strengthening of the implementation of the 
Rule of Law system in Kazakhstan. Specifically, the Project 
goals would be to strengthen the legal and judicial systems and 
selected institutions of the country in order to support and 
 
 178.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Loan in 
the Amount of US $4.7 Million to the Republic of Venezuela for a Supreme Court Modernization 
Project, Report No. 17212-VE (Dec. 9, 1997); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, 
supra note 5, at 87. 
 179.  Implementation Completion Report: Argentina 2006, supra note 144; WORLD BANK, 
INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 70-71. 
 180.  Project Appraisal Document: Kazakhstan 1999, supra note 80; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 60. 
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deepen the ongoing economic reform program.  
Project 
Components  
(a) Legal drafting and institutional strengthening 
(b) Judicial strengthening (court administration/case 
management and judicial training) 
(c) Legal information and public awareness 
(d) Project management and implementation 
Georgia Judicial 
Reform Project 
(1999)181 
Approved: June 1999 
Closed: June 2006 
Project Cost: 
US $16.2 million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $13.4 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Assist in the development of an independent and professional 
judiciary, committed to high standards of judicial ethics and 
capable of efficient, effective dispute resolution. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Court administration and case management 
(b) Infrastructure rehabilitation 
(c) Enforcement of court judgments 
(d) Assistance to the Ministry of Justice (legal drafting) 
(e) Judicial training center 
(f) Public information/education 
(g) Project management 
Republic Of Yemen 
Legal and Judicial 
Reform Project 
(1999)182 
Approved: June 1999 
Closed: June 2003 
Project Cost: 
US $2.94 million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $2.5 
million  
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Assist the Government of the Republic of Yemen in piloting a 
program of judicial training to assess its potential to enhance the 
effectiveness of the judiciary, and to enhance the capabilities of 
its ministry of legal and parliamentary affairs to prepare and 
advise on business and economic legislation outside of the court 
system. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Judicial development (training of judges and arbitrators and 
diagnostic assessments) 
(b) Legal development 
(c) Public awareness campaign 
Guatemala Judicial 
Reform Project 
(1999)183 
Approved: Oct. 1999 
Closed: June 2007 
Project Cost: 
US $49.7 million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $33 
million  
Project Support the Guatemalan judiciary in implementing its 
 
 181.  Project Appraisal Document: Georgia 1999, supra note 76; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 59. 
 182.  Project Appraisal Document: Yemen 1999, supra note 123; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 95. 
 183.  ICR: Guatemala 2008, supra note 106; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, 
supra note 5, at 79-80. 
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Development 
Objectives 
modernization plan. The project aimed to improve the 
administration of justice, strengthen judicial independence and 
accountability, and increase access to justice and confidence in 
the judicial system. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Strengthening institutional capacity of the judiciary branch 
(b) Providing anticorruption support (ethical standards, 
training, anti-corruption commission, disciplinary 
procedures) 
(c) Strengthening access to justice (justices of peace, mediation 
centers, mobile courts, service delivery, civil society 
participation program)  
(d) Social communications, modernization and project 
management 
Albania Legal and 
Judicial Reform 
Project (2000)184 
Approved: March 2000 
Closed: Dec. 2005 
Project Cost: 
US $9.5 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $9 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Provide required resources for technical assistance, training, 
goods, and works that are needed to implement important aspects 
of the Government’s institutional agenda for legal and justice 
system reforms, thereby contributing to the strengthening of the 
rule of law in Albania. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Improve legal education 
(b) Strengthen the justice system (court administration, case 
management, judicial training, enforcement of judicial 
decisions, judicial inspections) 
(c) ADR mechanisms for commercial disputes 
(d) Disseminate legal information  
(e) Project management 
Sri Lanka Legal and 
Judicial Reforms 
Project 185 
Approved: May 2000 
Closed: Feb. 2007 
Project Cost: 
US $21.14 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $18.2 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve upon the existing legal and judicial framework by 
making it more efficient, transparent, and responsive to the needs 
of the public at large and of the private sector in particular. More 
specifically, the project seeks to: (a) modernize the legislative 
framework that impacts private sector activity; (b) improve the 
administration, monitoring, and regulatory functions of the 
Company Registry; and (c) build capacity of the judiciary and 
other institutions providing dispute resolution services. 
 
 184.  Project Appraisal Document: Albania 2000, supra note 90; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 52. 
 185.  Project Appraisal Document: Sri Lanka 2000, supra note 105; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 102. 
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Project 
Components 
(a) Legal reform 
(b) Company registry improvements  
(c) Judicial reform (judicial education and training, 
administrative reorganizing, model courts, mediation center 
for commercial disputes)  
(d) Project management 
Morocco Legal and 
Judicial Development 
Project (2000)186 
Approved: June 2000 
Closed: June 2004 
Project Cost: 
US $12.2 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $11.4 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve the Moroccan capacity to resolve commercial disputes 
and to facilitate commercial transactions within the country.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Legal and regulatory framework 
(b) Case management and automation of commercial courts 
(c) Registries of commerce improvements 
(d) Judicial training 
(e) Capacity building of Ministry of Justice in communications 
and information  
(f) Project Implementation Unit 
Armenia Judicial 
Reform Project 
(2000)187 
Approved: Sept. 2000 
Closed: Dec. 2006 
Project Cost: 
US $6.73 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $5.3 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Assist in the development of an independent, accessible, and 
efficient judiciary in the Republic of Armenia, which is essential 
to governance, rule of law, and investment climate.  
More specifically, the project aims at: 
(a) strengthening judicial self-governance through support to 
the Council of Court Chairmen (CCC); 
(b) improvement of court administration and case management 
procedures; 
(c) development of a comprehensive institutional base for 
continuing education for judges and court personnel; 
(d) strengthening the service for enforcement of court decisions; 
(e) development of a comprehensive legal information system 
accessible to judges, legal professionals, business 
community and citizens; and 
(f) promotion of public awareness of laws and legal institutions. 
Project 
Components  
(a) Strengthening institutional capacity of the judiciary 
(Judicial governance, court administration, case 
 
 186.  Project Appraisal Document: Morocco 2000, supra note 110; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 93. 
 187.  Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2000, supra note 111; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 53-54. 
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management, court automation)  
(b) Court infrastructure réhabilitation 
(c) Training of judges and court personnel 
(d) Improving enforcement of court decisions 
(e) Dissemination of legal information 
(f) Public awareness and public education  
(g) Project management 
Bangladesh Legal and 
Judicial Capacity 
Building Project 
(2001)188 
Approved: March 2001 
Closed: Dec. 2008 
Project Cost: 
US $43.63 
million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $30.6 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the 
civil justice delivery system, and increase access to justice, 
particularly for women and the poor.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Judicial capacity building (court administration, case 
management, information systems, training, upgrading of 
court infrastructure) 
(b) Improving access to justice and promoting legal literacy 
and public awareness (gender sensitivity, ADR 
mechanisms, small case courts, legal aid, public awareness 
at grassroots and national level, bar association) 
(c) Legal reform capacity building (law commission, ministry 
of justice) 
(d) Preparation for future reforms 
(e) Project implementation and related services 
Azerbaijan Judicial 
Modernization Project 
(2006)189 
Approved: June 2006 
Closing Date: Dec. 2011 
Project Cost: 
US $35.60 
million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $21.6 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Assist the Azerbaijan authorities in developing, and 
implementing the initial phases of a long-term judicial system 
modernization program by building capacity to achieve 
incremental improvements in efficiency, citizen information, and 
its ability to handle future demand. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Strengthening the management capacity of judicial 
institutions 
(b) Upgrading court facilities 
(c) Human capital - strengthening professionalism of judges 
and staff 
(d) Improving citizen information, including strengthening of 
registries and notaries 
 
 188.  Project Appraisal Document: Bangladesh 2001, supra note 73; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 98-99. 
 189.  Project Appraisal Document: Azerbaijan 2006, supra note 122; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES 
IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 55. 
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Croatia Court and 
Bankruptcy 
Administration Project 
(2001)190 
Approved: June 2001 
Closed: Jan. 2007 
Project Cost: 
US $6.95 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $5 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Assist the Government of Croatia in advancing orderly 
insolvency proceedings while modernizing selected commercial 
courts and increasing professionalism and competence of judges, 
other staff of the commercial courts and bankruptcy trustees. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Commercial court administration and case management 
model 
(b) Legal information system 
(c) Regulatory framework for trustees and administrators 
(d) Upgrading skills of bankruptcy professionals 
(e) Insolvency and legal services framework 
(f) Project management 
Colombia Judicial 
Conflict Resolution 
Improvement Project 
(2001)191 
Approved: Nov. 2001 
Closed: June 2006 
Project Cost: 
US $6.66 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $5 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
To test a participatory and comprehensive organizational change 
strategy aimed at tackling the key levers of the courts’ 
organizational structure leading to improvements in the 
judiciary’s timeliness, quality and productivity in discharging its 
conflict resolution function. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Culture change 
(b) Human resources competence and capabilities 
(c) Organizational structure 
(d) Information systems 
(e) Court facilities 
(f) Communication and participation 
(g) Performance evaluation and rewards 
(h) Project management, monitoring, and evaluation 
Mongolia Legal and 
Judicial Reform 
Project (2001)192 
Approved: Dec. 2001 
Closed: April 2008 
Project Cost: 
US $5.55 
million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $5 
million 
Project 
Development 
Enhance public trust and confidence in the legal system as a 
whole and the judiciary in particular through the design and 
 
 190.  Project Appraisal Document: Croatia 2001, supra note 106; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 57-58. 
 191.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Loan in 
the Amount of US$5 Million to the Republic of Colombia for a Judicial Conflict Resolution 
Improvement Project, Report No. 23184-CO (Nov. 8, 2001); Clustered PPAR 2010, supra note 70, at 
13; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 75. 
 192.  Project Appraisal Document: Mongolia 2001, supra note 105; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 46. 
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Objectives testing of new tools and systems that promote better access to 
legal information, the creation of specialized courts and an 
improved legal education and profession.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Development of an administrative court system to promote 
transparency and governance (communication awareness 
campaign for the administrative court system, training of 
administrative judges and court personnel, infrastructure for 
the pilot administrative courts, new court management and 
case administration techniques for pilot courts) 
(b) Knowledge sharing and capacity building to foster access 
to justice (comprehensive public awareness activities and 
dissemination of legal and judicial information, electronic 
legal and judicial database, physical infrastructure for the 
National Center for Legal and Judicial Information, 
Research and Training, staff training, equipment and 
computers.) 
(c) Enhancing the legal education and legal profession to 
provide market based solutions for better delivery of 
Services  (training for trainers, development of techniques 
to monitor the effectiveness of legal education quality 
assessment, improve the legal profession) 
(d) Project unit support 
El Salvador Judicial 
Modernization Project 
(2002)193 
Approved: March 2004 
Closed: June 2010 
Project Cost:
US $ 23.87 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $18.2  
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve El Salvador’s judicial system by promoting measures 
aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, accessibility and 
credibility of its Judicial Branch, through a participatory process 
involving judges, technical and administrative staff and users of 
the judicial system. Specifically the project would: 
(1) strengthen the institutional management capacity of the 
Judicial Branch;  
(2) modernize the court system;  
(3) provide knowledge sharing to foster access to justice and 
transparency;  
(4) develop the professional competence and quality of officers 
and employees of the Judicial Branch; and 
(5) support Project management, monitoring and evaluation.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Strengthening of the institutional management capacity of 
the Judicial Branch (developing administrative quality 
standards; designing an integrated planning system, and 
developing an international grant resource management 
program) 
 
 193.  Project Appraisal Document: El Salvador 2002, supra note 105; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES 
IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 78. 
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(b) Court system modernization (developing a court remapping 
plan, strengthening of the automated judicial and 
administrative case management program, updating models 
of judicial organization, and expanding judicial 
infrastructure) 
(c) Knowledge sharing to foster access to justice and 
transparency (designing a system for inspection and control 
of judicial services, carrying out legal outreach programs 
aimed at civil society groups, and up-grading judicial 
documentation centers and libraries) 
(d) Development of the professional quality and competence of 
judicial officers and employees (improving the Judicial 
branch’s human resources policies and promoting the role of 
judges in El Salvador’s economic and social development) 
(e) Project management, monitoring and evaluation  
Philippines Judicial 
Reform Support 
Project (2003)194 
Approved: Aug. 2003 
Closed: Dec. 2009 
Project Cost: 
US $24.42 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $21.9 
million  
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Support the development of a more effective and accessible 
judicial system that would foster public trust and confidence. 
Specifically, the Project will assist in: 
(a) Ensuring speedy and fair dispensation of justice to all by 
improving the efficiency of case adjudication and access to 
justice 
(b) Upgrading the integrity of the judiciary 
(c) Strengthening institutional capabilities 
(d) Promoting stakeholder support for reform of the judiciary 
Project 
Components 
(a) Strengthening case adjudication and access to justice (case 
management system, court records management system, 
computer-aided transcription technology, court jurisdictional 
structure, policy development on affordability constraints to 
access to the court system by the poor, mobile courts, 
information and communications technology) 
(b) Enhancing institutional integrity (code of ethics, alternative 
feedback mechanisms on judicial performance, 
computerized judicial performance management system, 
professional development for excellence) 
(c) Strengthening institutional capacity of the judiciary 
(Decentralizing administrative functions, financial 
management systems, court infrastructure, electronic 
judicial library and research facilities)  
 
 194.  Project Appraisal Document: Philippines 2003, supra note 134; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES 
IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 47-48. 
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(d) Stakeholder support for reform and program 
Mexico State Judicial 
Modernization Project 
(2004)195 
Approved: July 2004 
Closing Date: Dec. 2011 
Project Cost: 
US $37.5 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $30 
million  
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Support the improvement of institutional performance of 
judiciaries in a few states through a credit program of the 
National Bank of Works and Public Services (BANOBRA) for 
state judicial modernization.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Strengthen institutional capabilities, organizational culture 
and knowledge (specialized studies, strategic planning, 
performance evaluation system, change management, 
knowledge sharing)  
(b) Improve efficiency and effectiveness of judicial services 
(organizational and management models, case backlog 
reduction, case distribution, professional development and 
career systems, integrated management systems, training, 
research, infrastructure)  
(c) Increase judicial transparency (information and 
communication mechanisms, disciplinary and 
accountability systems, public awareness)  
(d) Strengthen access to justice for all users (outreach to 
special and disadvantaged groups, ADR mechanisms, small 
claims courts, public defender, legal aid, infrastructure, bar 
associations)  
(e) Support Project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, 
and learning, including consultation with Project 
stakeholders 
Peru Justice Services 
Modernization Project 
(2005)196 
Approved: April 2005 
Closed: March 2010 
Project Cost: 
US $15 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $12 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Set the foundation for a long term, participatory, and sustainable 
reform process for Peru’s justice sector. Specific objectives will 
be: (a) to strengthen institutional capacity to lead the reform 
process and achieve specific improvements in justice services 
delivery, in particular in the Judiciary and in selected project 
 
 195.  Project Appraisal Document: Mexico 2004, supra note 121; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 81; World Bank, Project Paper on Restructuring the Mexico: 
State Judicial Modernization Supporting Access to Justice Project, at 3, Report No. 48695 (July 10, 
2008) (extending the closing date to December, 2011). 
 196.  Project Appraisal Document: Peru 2004, supra note 74 ; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 82; Justice Services Improvement Peru, Project ID P073438, 
Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/ 
projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P0
73438  (last updated Feb. 17, 2004). 
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districts; (b) to establish human resource management systems 
that ensure independence, transparency and integrity; and (c) to 
enhance access to justice services for the Peruvian society, in 
particular the poor. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Improved justice services delivery (planning and 
management, court administration, court operations) 
(b)  Judicial human resources professional development 
(judicial selection and evaluation, training, human resources 
management)  
(c)  Access to justice (accountability and integrity, legal aid, 
ADR mechanisms, other pro-poor services, public outreach) 
(d)  Project management, coordination, and monitoring 
assistance 
Honduras Judicial 
Branch Modernization 
Project (2005)197 
Approved: July 2005 
Closing Date: June 2011 
Project Cost: 
US $15 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $12 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Support implementation of the Judicial Branch Modernization 
Plan 2004-2009. The project aims to improve the capacity and 
performance of the Judicial Branch in three areas: (a) greater 
efficiency of case processing, judgments and appeals; (b) 
enhanced transparency and accountability; and (c) better access 
to justice, especially for the most disadvantaged groups.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Improvement of the efficiency of judicial services 
(streamlined judicial processes, management systems) 
(b) Enhancing judicial accountability and transparency 
(judicial career systems, training, institutional performance 
monitoring and auditing, information dissemination) 
(c) Promoting equitable access to justice (ADR mechanisms, 
public awareness, public defender) 
(d) Project coordination, monitoring, and evaluation 
Romania Judicial 
Reform Project 
(2005)198 
Approved: Nov. 2005 
Closing Date: March 
2013 
Project Cost: 
US $171.86 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $130 
million 
Project Increase efficiency of the Romanian courts and improve 
 
 197.  Project Appraisal Document: Honduras 2005, supra note 122; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 80; Judicial Branch Modernization Honduras, Project ID 
P081516, Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank. 
org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&P
rojectid=P081516 (last updated June 20, 2005). 
 198.  Project Appraisal Document: Romania 2005, supra note 120; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 64; Judicial Reform Romania, Project ID P090309, Project-at-
a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/ 
main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P090309 
(last updated Oct. 7, 2010). 
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Development 
Objectives 
accountability of the judiciary which should result in reduced 
corruption and more transparent act of justice. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Court infrastructure rehabilitation 
(b) Strengthening the administrative capacity of courts (case 
management, court administration)  
(c) Integrated resource management system for the judiciary 
(d) Institutional development of judicial institutions (policy 
development, communications, judicial administration, 
judicial selection, promotion and training, technology) 
Sudan Capacity 
Building of the 
National Judiciary 
(2006)199 
Approved: Feb. 2006 
Closed: June 2009 
Project Cost: 
US $18 
million 
Grant 
Amount: 
US $13 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary to enhance its 
independence, build the knowledge base of judges, and empower 
the judiciary to effectively and fairly apply the law and deliver 
justice  
Project 
Components 
(a) Support for the National Judicial Service Commission 
(NJSC) 
(b) Judicial training 
(c) Establishment of the National Legal Resource and Training 
Center and rehabilitation of the Judiciary’s existing 
training facility 
(d) Rehabilitation of selected court facilities 
Macedonia Legal and 
Judicial 
Implementation and 
Institutional Support 
Project (2006)200 
Approved: June 2006 
Closing Date: March 
2012 
Project Cost: 
US $14.7 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $12.4 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Contribute to improving judicial efficiency and effectiveness and 
the business climate in FYR Macedonia by:  
(i) enhancing ministerial and judicial capacity to systemically 
implement the Government’s Judicial Reform Strategy and key 
laws; and (ii) improving judicial infrastructure. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Ministerial and judicial capacity building (improving the 
quality of judicial management of the judiciary, 
administrative inspections and administrative dispute 
resolution, improving bankruptcy administration and 
ministry of economy supervision) 
 
 199.  2006 Sudan Capacity, supra note 126; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, 
supra note 5, at 32. 
 200.  Project Appraisal Document: Macedonia 2006, supra note 121; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES 
IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 63; Legal & Judicial Implementation & Institutional Support 
Project Macedonia, Project ID P089859, Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & 
OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230& the 
SitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P089859 (last updated Nov. 10, 2010). 
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(b) Improving judicial infrastructure 
(c) Enhancing judicial information technology systems 
(d) Project implementation 
Sudan Southern Sudan 
Justice Support 
Project (2006)201 
Approved: March 2007 
Closed: Dec. 2009 
Project Cost: 
US $45 
million 
Grant 
Amount: 
US $ 5.3 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Develop the capacity of the Police and Prison Services to 
deliver professional services is substantially increased across 
Southern Sudan. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Infrastructure 
(b) Institutional development 
(c) Training 
(d) Inmate care and treatment 
(e) Project management  
Russian Federation 
Judicial Reform 
Support Project 
(2007)202 
Approved: Feb. 2007 
Closing Date: March 
2012 
Project Cost: 
US $172.41 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $50 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Strengthen judicial transparency and efficiency in courts 
financed by the JRSP.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Institutionalizing judicial transparency and accountability 
(user surveys, publicity of judicial decisions, case 
management, judicial effectiveness assessment, 
communications and change management) 
(b) Harnessing ICT for judicial transparency and effectiveness 
(Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, CGJ and Judicial 
Department, Supreme Arbitration Court) 
(c) Strengthening human capital (workshops, knowledge 
sharing, IT-related training) 
(d) Project management, monitoring, and evaluation 
Armenia Second 
Judicial Reform 
Project (2007)203 
Approved: March 2007 
Closing Date: Dec. 2012 
Project Cost: 
US $32.69 
million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $22.5 
million 
Project 
Development 
Provide Armenia’s judiciary with the administration, facilities 
and expanded capacity necessary to improve the efficiency, 
 
 201.   World Bank, Sudan Multi Donor Trust Fund, Final Project Proposal, Police and Prison 
Support Project, Juba (Oct. 2006); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, 
at 33. 
 202.   Project Appraisal Document: Russia 2007, supra note 121; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 65-66. 
 203.  Project Appraisal Document: Armenia 2007, supra note 115; WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN 
JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 54. 
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Objectives reliability and transparency of judicial operations and services; 
and continue to improve public awareness of judicial services 
and access to legal and judicial information.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Strengthening judicial governance and administration 
(capacity building of reformed Council of Justice, new 
Judicial Department, rollout of the court administration and 
case management system) 
(b) Courthouse rehabilitation 
(c) Judicial training school 
(d) Improving enforcement of judicial decisions 
(e) Strengthening arbitration services 
(f) Expanding access to legal information and public 
awareness 
(g) Project management 
Afghanistan Judicial 
Sector Reform Project 
(2008)204 
Approved: May 2008 
Closing Date: June 2011 
Project Cost: 
US $27.75 
million 
Grant 
Amount: 
US 
$27.75 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
To strengthen the centralized state justice system in Afghanistan 
and increase access to justice for the Afghan people. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Strengthening capacity of legal institutions to deliver legal 
services (human resources management, infrastructure, 
information and communication technology) 
(b) Empowering the people (legal aid, legal awareness 
campaign) 
Mongolia Enhanced 
Justice Services 
Project (2008)205 
Approved: June 2008 
Closing Date: Dec. 2012 
Project Cost: 
US $6.95 
million 
Credit 
Amount: 
US $5 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Support Mongolian justice sector institutions enhance their 
efficiency, transparency and accountability through capacity 
improvements. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Enhancing public legal education on the justice sector 
(b) Increasing transparency through improved access to legal 
information  
(c) Enhancing judicial operations, enforcement and 
 
 204.  World Bank, Implementation Status and Results, Afghanistan Judicial Reform Project, Report 
No. ISR3408 (June 14, 2011); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 
98. 
 205.  World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 2.07 
Million (US 3.7 Million Equivalent) and a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 1.03 Million (US$ 1.3 
Million Equivalent) to Mongolia for a Enhanced Justice Sector Services Project, Report No. 44059-
MN, (June 6, 2008); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 5, at 45-46. 
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monitoring of court decisions 
(d) Project management  
Serbia Justice Sector 
Support Project 
(2008)206 
Approved: Dec. 2008 
Closing Date: Dec. 2011 
Project Cost: 
US $4.7 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $4.0 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Facilitation of the acceleration of Serbia’s European Union 
integration process pertaining to the justice sector.  
This will be done by supporting (i) strengthening institutional 
capacity; (ii) the improvement of justice sector performance and 
(iii) increased aid effectiveness. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Institutional capacity ( facilitate capacity-building in the 
MOJ, judiciary and the MOF to design, coordinate and 
implement judicial reform and modernization programs)  
(b) Resource management and aid coordination (facilitate the 
justice sector leadership to strengthen justice sector 
resource management and aid coordination)  
(c) Legal and institutional environment (facilitate the 
strengthening of the legal and institutional environment for 
the judiciary)  
(d) Judicial facilities and infrastructure 
(e) Outreach, monitoring and evaluation  
Colombia Justice 
Services Strengthening 
Project (2009)207 
Approved: Dec. 2009 
Closing Date: Dec. 2013 
Project 
Cost: 
US $20 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $20 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Strengthen the capacity of the Judiciary and the Ministry of 
Interior and Justice to deliver timely, efficient, effective and 
quality dispute resolution services to citizens  
Project 
Components 
(a) Efficient management of justice services (management and 
communications systems) 
(b) Development of judicial human resources (training, 
performance evaluation systems) 
(c) Facilitating access to justice services (justice services map, 
justice services survey, decentralization, ADR mechanisms) 
(d) Project coordination 
 
 206.   World Bank, Republic of Serbia, Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support Project, 
Report No. TF071171 (Dec. 1, 2008); WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009, supra note 
5, at 67; Serbia Justice Sector Support Multi Donor Trust Fund, Project ID P121377, Project-at-a-
Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/ 
main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P121377 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2011). 
 207.  Project Appraisal Document: Colombia 2009, supra note 159; Justice Services Strengthening 
Colombia, Project ID P083904, Project-at-a-Glance, THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS & OPERATIONS, 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941
&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P083904 (last updated Dec. 1, 2009). 
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Croatia Justice Center 
Support Project208 
Approved: April 2010 
Closing Date: June 2015 
Project 
Cost: 
US $37.84 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $36.3 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve the efficiency of Croatia’s justice system.  
Project 
Components 
(a) Improving the efficiency of the court system (infrastructure, 
management capacity building, information technology, 
performance evaluation, case management, enforcement of 
judicial decisions) 
(b) Improving the efficiency of the state attorney’s office 
(infrastructure, capacity building, case management and 
information technology) 
(c) Strengthening the efficiency of the Ministry of Justice’s 
management functions 
(d) Support for project management and implementation  
Peru Justice Services 
Improvement Project 
II (2010)209 
Approved: Nov. 2010 
Closing Date: Sept. 2015 
Project Cost: 
US $30 
million 
Loan 
Amount: 
US $20 
million 
Project 
Development 
Objectives 
Improve the quality of service delivery by the Participating 
Institutions and to enhance access to justice with a focus on 
citizens’ needs for justice services. 
Project 
Components 
(a) Improved justice services delivery (planning and 
management, case management) 
(b) Improved human resources management capacity 
(c) Enhanced transparency and access to justice (disciplinary 
capacity, communications strategy, legal aid, public legal 
education)  
(d) Project management, monitoring, and evaluation 
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